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THE RACE TO THE MIDDLE
William Magnuson*
How does federalism affect the quality of law? It is one of the fundamental questions of our
constitutional system. Scholars of federalism generally fall into one of two camps on the question.
One camp argues that regulatory competition between states leads to a "race to the bottom," in
which states adopt progressively worse laws in order to pander to powerful constituencies. The
other camp, conversely, argues that regulatory competition leads to a "race to the top," incentiviz-
ing states to adopt progressively better laws in the search for more desirable outcomes for their
constituencies. Despite their apparent differences, however, both the race-to-the-bottom camp and
the race-to-the-top camp share one fundamental assumption-that federalism leads to extremes.
In other words, when states compete on regulatory regimes, they inevitably race to high or low
levels of regulation, hoping to outdo one another by distinguishing themselves from their peers.
This Article, however, argues that both of these federalism models fail to account for another
powerful dynamic that pushes states, not to distinguish themselves from the crowd, but rather to
fit into it. This "race to the middle" leads states to adopt regulations that are similar, or even
identical, to the regulations adopted by large numbers of other states. The resulting race to the
middle causes state law to gravitate toward mediocre but satisfactory regulatory outcomes, not
efficient or inefficient ones. The Article demonstrates how the "race to the middle" is driven by
four interrelated factors: first, the informational benefits that accrue to states that adopt well-
established legal regimes; second, the demand by constituents, and in particular corporations, for
familiar regulatory regimes; third, the network effects from interoperable regulatory regimes; and
fourth, the reduced risk of federal intervention that arises when states adopt mainstream regula-
tory structures. The Article concludes by assessing the implications of the race to the middle for
theories of federalism and democratic governance.
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INTRODUCTION
How does federalism affect the quality of state law? It is a difficult ques-
tion that scholars have struggled with, and disagreed about, for decades. At
its core, though, the question is a simple one. States are free to establish
their own laws in a wide variety of areas and thus inevitably face choices about
which laws to adopt. In making these choices, states are informed by the laws
in place in other states. Their eventual choices will, in turn, inform the
choices that other states make about their own laws. Given this dynamic, how
should we expect states to act?
Scholars that have addressed the question generally fall into one of two
camps: those who see federalism as leading to a "race to the bottom"' and
those who see it as leading to a "race to the top."
2 The race-to-the-bottom
1 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (arguing that state charter
competition leads to undesirable corporate law rules in a number of areas); William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974)
(describing the "race for the bottom, with Delaware in the lead" in corporate-governance
standards); Lynn M. LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REv. 2101, 2104
(2018) (arguing that charter competition's "principal effects are to deregulate corpora-
tions and shield them from the democratic reimposition of regulation"); Donald E.
Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 545, 555-56 (1984) (arguing
that federalism leads to a number of endemic defects in corporate-governance laws); Rich-
ard B. Stewart, Pyramids ofSacrifice? Problems ofFederalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) (arguing that individual state
refusals to adopt high environmental standards lead to a tragedy of the commons); Peter
P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition
Among juisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'v REv. (Symp. IssuE) 67 (1996)
(arguing that state competition would lead to significant failures in environmental law if
the federal government were to repeal its standards).
2 See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL EcoNOMY 259 (1995) (arguing that competition among states may lead to a "ratch-
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camp views federalism as creating a powerful incentive for states to engage in
harmful and inefficient deregulation. According to this line of thought, state
legislatures desire to attract corporations to their jurisdictions in order to
increase tax revenues, create jobs, and generally improve their economies.
But in order to appeal to the corporations and corporate executives that
make decisions about where to locate business, states must adopt regulations
that are more permissive than the regulations in force in other states. As each
state adopts progressively looser regulations in order to outdo their neigh-
bors, the resulting degradation of standards leads to suboptimal levels of reg-
ulation, whether it be in shareholder protections,3 labor laws,4 tax levels,5 or
environmental standards.6
The race-to-the-top camp sees things differently. According to this
model of federalism, competition between states on regulatory structures in
fact leads to better, more efficient levels of regulation.7 While the precise
dynamics of this process differ depending on the issue area, the basic argu-
ment is that if the market is functioning correctly, corporations should bene-
fit from better regulation, not from the absence of it. After all, corporations
have constituencies as well, and if their shareholders are regularly fleeced by
corporate management or their employees live in polluted cities, they will
eventually lobby for change (or go elsewhere). As a result, states have incen-
tives to provide regulations that promote overall prosperity, rather than
favoring the narrow interests of the few. Over time, then, states should pro-
eting upward of regulatory standards in competing political jurisdictions"); Jonathan H.
Adler, Interstate Competition and the Race to the Top, 35 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 89 (2012)
(arguing that "robust interjurisdictional competition facilitates the enactment of better
public policy at the state level"); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1210, 1212 (1992) (arguing that competition among states on environmental regula-
tions leads to an efficient allocation of industrial activity); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6J. LECAL STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing
that state competition on corporate law tends toward optimal regulation).
3 See Cary, supra note 1; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 555-56.
4 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) ("The motive and purpose of
[federal labor laws] are plainly to make effective the Congressional conception of public
policy that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the
distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is
injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows.").
5 See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 377, 380 (1996) (arguing that the "accel-
erating use of state tax incentives to attract and retain businesses . . . is costly and unpro-
ductive" but that "each state finds it difficult to walk away from the competition as long as
other states continue to up the ante").
6 See Swire, supra note 1.
7 There is a sharp divide within the race-to-the-top scholarship on whether the "top"
that is being raced to is optimal regulation or rather stricter regulation. For examples of the
former, see Winter, supra note 2, at 254; and Revesz, supra note 2, at 1214. For examples of
the latter, see VOGEL, supra note 2; and Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1, 5 (2012).
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gressively improve the quality and efficiency of their regulatory structures in
order to outcompete their neighboring states.
Despite their disagreements, however, both the race-to-the-bottom and
race-to-the-top theories share one fundamental assumption-that states race
to distinguish their laws from the laws of other states.
8 In other words, for
there to be a race upward or downward, states must seek to outdo one
another, either by steadily loosening their regulations or steadily tightening
them. Both theories take for granted that this dynamic will lead to ever more
extreme regulatory structures.
But the assumption that interstate competition leads inevitably to differ-
entiation overlooks another powerful aspect of interstate competition that in
many ways counteracts the races to the top and bottom. This dynamic, which
may usefully be called the "race to the middle," pushes states toward regula-
tory schemes that are similar or identical to the schemes adopted by suffi-
ciently large numbers of other states. The race to the middle encourages
states to focus on harmonizing, not differentiating, their regulatory
structures.
The race to the middle is driven by four interrelated factors, all of which
provide benefits to states from adopting well-established regulatory structures
already prevailing in other states. First, states that adopt regulatory structures
already existing in other states benefit from informational effects about the
benefits and risks of the structure. Second, the prevalence of an already-
established regulatory structure provides greater familiarity and, thus, cer-
tainty to corporations and other regulated actors about the effects of the reg-
ulation on their activities, thereby increasing the attractiveness of
jurisdictions that adopt that structure. Third, states benefit from network
effects when they adopt regulatory structures that are interoperable with the
regulatory structures in place in other states. And finally, states that adopt
well-established regulatory structures that are common across the nation are
less likely to face regulatory intervention from federal lawmakers.
In many ways, the race to the middle is a reassuring phenomenon. It
suggests that regulatory competition does not inevitably lead to ever more
extreme forms of regulation. It counteracts countervailing pressures for
states to race to the bottom by deregulating at the expense of consumers and
citizens or overregulating to the detriment of beneficial corporate activity.
And it works to reduce the magnitude and prevalence of conflicting laws that
can raise the cost of doing business across borders.
But the race to the middle is not without costs. In fact, it raises a num-
ber of new and underappreciated concerns about the nature of federalism
and its effects on state competition. First, in a kind of elevated "tyranny of
the majority" problem, the race to the middle may allow suboptimal, but
widely adopted, regulatory schemes to crowd out more efficient, but sparsely
adopted, ones. Second, the race to the middle may reduce policy innovation
8 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. Scorr, EcoNoMIcs OF CORPORATION LAw
AND SECURITIEs REGuLATION 111 (1980) (arguing that states differentiate their regulatory
regimes in order to appeal to particular constituencies).
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as states seek to engage in copycat regulation rather than acting as laborato-
ries of democracy. Third, the race to the middle reduces the ability of indi-
viduals and companies to "vote with their feet" by leaving one jurisdiction
and moving to another.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the scholarly litera-
ture on regulatory competition and describes the conventional wisdom
regarding races to the bottom and races to the top. Part II sets forth an
alternative dynamic by which regulatory competition may lead to races to the
middle where states seek to adopt regulatory schemes that are consistent
with, or even identical to, the schemes already present in other jurisdictions.
Part III concludes by outlining a set of implications of, and potential con-
cerns regarding, races to the middle.
I. THE RACES TO THE EXTREMES
Federalist principles underlie much of our constitutional system.9 While
the precise contours of where the national government's powers end and
state governments' powers begin are the subject of vociferous debate,'0 it is
indisputable that states have broad discretion to set their own laws and regu-
lations in a variety of policy areas." This decentralized system is widely
understood to promote a set of values essential to our democracy, from pro-
tecting autonomy to promoting popular sovereignty to encouraging policy
experimentation.1 2 One important consequence of federalist principles,
however, is that state laws interact with each other, sometimes in unexpected
ways.'3 Low taxes in one state may attract corporations away from states with
higher taxes, but better public services may push individuals in the opposite
9 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 (1987);
Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REv. 4, 6 (2010);
Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and judicial Review: The Role of
Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1987). But seeJohn F. Manning, Federalism and the
Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARv. L. REv. 2003 (2009).
10 See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAz.AR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 162 (2d
ed. 1972); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966); John Kincaid, The Competitive Challenge to Coop-
erative Federalism: A Theoy of Federal Democracy, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 87, 87-88 (Daphne A. Kenyon &John Kincaid eds., 1991); Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215
(2000); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federal-
ism Theories, 79 TEx. L. REv. 1459 (2001); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and
Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983).
11 See Lea Brilmayer & Ronald D. Lee, State Sovereignty and the Two Faces ofFederalism: A
Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60 NOTRE DA~ME L. REv. 833,
833 (1985).
12 See Amar, supra note 9, at 1428.
13 See Adler, supra note 2, at 89; Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Compe-
tition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 685 (2002); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition,
117 HARV. L. REv. 588, 591 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2491,
2493 (2005).
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direction.14 Strong labor protections in one state may push corporations to
relocate to states with weaker protections, but better employment opportuni-
ties may push individuals in the opposite direction.'
5 These interactions cre-
ate opportunities for competition between states, as local legislatures seek to
attract individuals and companies to their jurisdictions.'
6
The ultimate result of this regulatory competition is uncertain. On the
one hand, it may lead to a race to the bottom, in which states eliminate bene-
ficial (but costly) regulation in order to attract businesses to their states.'
7
On the other hand, it may lead to a race to the top, in which states attempt to
improve their regulations in an effort to create an environment that effi-
ciently balances the interests of all relevant actors.'
8 These opposing dynam-
ics, which may be referred to as "races to the extremes," both suggest that
states are engaged in a long-term competition to distinguish themselves from
other states by offering different and ever more extreme regulatory schemes
in order to "outcompete" their neighbors. This Part will describe federal-
ism's role in promoting regulatory competition among states, outline com-
peting models for how this regulatory competition unfolds, and set out a few
initial thoughts on why these models are flawed.
A. Federalism and Regulatory Competition
Federalism is a bedrock principle of our constitutional system.'
9 It per-
meates debates about law, civics, and ideology, and scholars continue to dis-
cuss its proper role in the American political system.
20 At its core, however, it
embodies a simple principle: the national government is a government of
limited powers, with important powers reserved for the province of the
14 See Robert S. Chirinko & Daniel J. Wilson, Tax Competition Among U.S. States: Racing
to the Bottom or Riding on a Seesaw? (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2008-03,
2017), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp08-03bk.pdf (arguing that state
tax levels fluctuate strategically based on changing out-of-state tax policy, preferences for
government services, and economic and demographic conditions).
15 See Ronald B. Davies & Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, A Race to the Bottom in
Labor Standards?An Empirical Investigation, 103J. DEv. EcoN. 1, 1 (2013); Timothy P. Glynn,
Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Manage-
ment and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381, 1382 (2008); Steven L.
Willborn, Labor Law and the Race to the Bottom, 65 MERCER L. REv. 369, 369 (2014).
16 See Mark J. Roe, Regulatory Competition in Making Corporate Law in the United States-
And Its Limits, 21 OXFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y 232, 232-33 (2005).
17 See supra note 1.
18 See supra note 2.
19 See supra note 9.
20 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARv. L. REv. 1077 (2014)
(arguing that partisanship explains why states check the federal government and why citi-
zens identify with states as well as the nation); Heather K Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of
Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 85 (2014) (describing three views of federalism, respec-
tively, comic, heroic, and tragic); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J.
1996 (2014); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and
Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094 (2014) (arguing that federalism's core value is its
creation of a framework for negotiating disagreement).
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states.2 1 This idea, that governmental authority must be shared between the
national government, on the one hand, and state governments, on the other,
has given rise to the peculiarly American system of decentralization in which
states have significant decisional power over broad swathes of regulatory
policy.22
The principle of federalism is often justified by reference to a set of val-
ues core to the ideals of democratic governance.2 3 Federalism is said to pro-
mote choice by allowing states to adopt the policies that most closely align with
the beliefs of their citizens and allowing citizens to move between the
states.24 It is said to encourage experimentation by allowing states to adopt new
and innovative policies to address the problems facing their citizens.25 It is
said to protect citizens from tyranny by diffusing power among the several
states and preventing the national government from consolidating ever
greater powers.26 And it is said to foster civic education by encouraging citi-
zens to participate more directly in the process of self-governance.27 All of
21 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1494 (1994).
22 These reserved powers extend to the so-called "police powers," related to the
health, safety, and morals of citizens, but the precise outlines of state authority are the
subject of fierce debate. See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 429, 429 (2004) ("When it comes to the power of states over their people, the
issue has always been shrouded in doubt.").
23 See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views ofFederalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1229 (1994) (arguing that theories of federalism can be categorized into nationalist,
laboratory, political-market, political-safeguards, and double-source-of-protection perspec-
tives); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1493-1511 (1987) (book review).
24 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 10, at 222.
25 Of course, the canonical statement here isJustice Brandeis's dissent in New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, in which he states that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he 50 States serve as
laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas. This state
innovation is no judicial myth." (footnote omitted)); Amar, supra note 23, at 1233-36 (crit-
ically evaluating the perspective of states as laboratories of democracy); McConnell, supra
note 23, at 1498-1500 (analyzing the economic arguments behind state innovation).
26 This effect of the federal system was famously remarked upon by de Tocqueville,
who wrote:
It is incontestably true that the love and the habits of republican government
in the United States were engendered in the townships and in the provincial
assemblies.... [Ilt is this same republican spirit, it is these manners and customs
of a free people, which are engendered and nurtured in the different States, to be
afterwards applied to the country at large.
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 181 (Henry Reeve trans., London, Long-
man, Green, Longman & Roberts 1862) (1835).
27 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 92-94 (1995).
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these values-choice, experimentation, protection from tyranny, and educa-
tion-are thought to be advanced by our system of federalism.
2 8
Of course, the result of federalism is that states maintain substantial free-
dom to choose laws that differ from the laws of their neighbors, or, for that
matter, from the laws of the national government. Colorado, for example,
was free to decriminalize recreational marijuana use in 2013, despite the fact
that such use was prohibited in other states and, indeed, under national
law.29 California, similarly, was free to establish a cap-and-trade system for
greenhouse gas emissions in 2012 in order to combat global warming,
despite the notable lack of such a scheme at the national level.
30 And Illinois
was free in 2015 to pass legislation regulating the use of police body cameras
to reduce police abuse, despite the failure of other states to do the same.
3 '
One important corollary to this principle of differentiation in state law is
that states are free to compete with one another through their legislation as
well. If one state offers a set of employee-friendly employment rules (say,
generous maternity leave) that ends up drawing citizens to their state, other
states may decide to enact even more employee-friendly rules (say, generous
maternity and paternity leave) in order to outdo the other state. If one state
offers generous business incentives (say, low corporate income taxes) that
end up drawing corporations to their state, other states may decide to enact
even more generous business incentives (say, no corporate income taxes) in
order to win those corporations back to their own states. In other words,
federalism potentially leads to regulatory competition among the states.
32
Regulatory competition, of course, is not a free-for-all. There are impor-
tant limitations on the bounds of this competition, limitations imposed by
the Constitution, federal law, and political realities. The Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, which provides that national law trumps state law, pre-
vents states from competing in such a way that would conflict with Congres-
sional action.33 Preemption doctrine goes even further, preventing states
from acting at all in any area over which Congress has occupied the regula-
28 See Gerken, supra note 9, at 12.
29 This development was certainly not without controversy. See Erwin Chemerinsky et
al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 77 (2015) (arguing
that "[t]he struggle over marijuana regulation is one of the most important federalism
conflicts in a generation").
30 See David Sloss, California's Climate Diplomacy and Dormant Preemption, 56 WASH BuRN
L.J. 507, 511-13 (2017) (describing the history and effects of California's cap-and-trade
system).
31 See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L.
REV. 395, 413-19 (2016) (discussing the divergent state laws on the use of police body
cameras).
32 See Francesco Parisi et al., Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition, 26 IwT'L REv. L. &
EcoN. 56 (2006).
33 See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 342-43 (1997) (dis-
cussing the effects of the Supremacy Clause on federalism).
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tory field.3 4 The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from compet-
ing in such a way that discriminates against interstate commerce or places an
excessive burden on commerce.3 5 And the fact that states must interact with
one another in the House of Representatives and the Senate in order to pro-
tect their interests imposes significant pressures on states to not overstep the
norms of proper regulatory competition.3 6
The presence of regulatory competition as a structural feature of federal-
ism has deep consequences for our system of democratic governance. States
are free-within limits, of course-to enact policies that favor themselves and
disfavor, or even harm, others. They need not establish rules that mirror or
harmonize with the laws of other states. And they have substantial leeway to
respond to legislative enactments in other states with regulations of their
own. The consequences of this competition on the quality and substance of
law are thus matters of supreme importance. They are also, perhaps under-
standably, the subject of substantial debate.
B. The Race to the Bottom
A prominent group of scholars has argued that federalism leads to a race
to the bottom in state law." By the race to the bottom, these scholars gener-
ally mean that states enact progressively less efficient or desirable legal
regimes as a result of regulatory competition.3 8 For example, in the corpo-
rate law context, it is often used to refer to the adoption of management-
friendly and shareholder-hostile regulations.3  In the environmental law
context, it often means lowering pollution-control standards.40 And in the
taxation context, it often refers to the reduction of tax rates.4 ' In each of
these contexts, the term has a negative connotation-that is, that regulatory
competition will lead to excessively management-friendly corporate laws, exces-
sively lax environmental laws, and excessively low tax rates.
34 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000) (analyzing modern preemp-
tion doctrine and the interaction between federal and state law).
35 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on the Dormant Commerce Clause is motivated exclusively by the
desire to prevent states from engaging in "purposeful economic protectionism").
36 Although it is unclear to what extent these norms of behavior remain a significant
limiting principle on state action. See Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal
Constitutional Dysfunction ?, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (2015). But seeJacob E. Gersen & Eric
A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REv. 573 (2008).
37 See supra note 1.
38 Id.
39 See Cary, supra note 1, at 685-86.
40 See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling
Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U.
L. REv. 579, 597-98 (2008).
41 See Roger J. Vaughan, State Taxation and Economic Development, in STATE TAXATION
POLIcY 3, 78 (Michael Barker ed., 1983).
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Why would state legislatures adopt inefficient laws? dne explanation, of
course, would be that they simply do not know the full effects of their laws, or
perhaps they are simply incompetent at drafting them.
42 But, importantly,
race-to-the-bottom scholars typically do not assume that legislators are irra-
tional. Instead, they argue that their very rationality, and their pursuit of
their own states' interests, obliges them to adopt suboptimal laws.
4 3 Racing
to the bottom is a rational choice.
The race to the bottom is rational because states compete for the busi-
ness of corporations.44 They of course compete for a number of things, but
race-to-the-bottom scholars typically focus on the scarce resource of corporate
presence.45 This can mean both formal incorporations with their respective
secretaries of state and less formal activities (such as the setting up of offices,
manufacturing of goods, or selling of products in a state).46 In each of these
cases, corporate presence confers benefits to the state-in the form of fees,
taxes, employment, wages, and other matters.
4 7 States have an interest in
maximizing these goods, as they contribute to the overall welfare of their
populations, and thus they rationally seek to attract corporate presence.
But, paradoxically, states' rational pursuit of corporate business ulti-
mately ends up harming them.4 8 The primary tool that states use to attract
corporations to their jurisdictions is regulatory structure.
4 9 In particular,
42 This is not certainly not an implausible premise. SeeAdamJ. Hirsch, Cognitive juris-
prudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1331 (2003) (describing the various forms of bounded rational-
ity that affect lawmakers).
43 See, e.g., Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital
Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 375, 401 (2011) (describing
the rationality of state governments in engaging in a race-to-the-bottom in environmental
regulation).
44 See Alvin K. Kievorick, The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World
of Trade Policy, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. (SYMP. ISSUE) 177, 178 (1996) ("At the heart of this
race to the bottom argument is the view that the competitive process among countries is
imperfect.").
45 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the Bottom!
Top, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 381, 384 (2005) ("Each state has an incentive to entice out-of-
state corporations to incorporate under its law because it derives tax revenue from the
corporation.").
46 Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 225, 233-40 (1985) (describing the dynamic of competition for incorporations).
47 See Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 13, at 590 ("States, or at least some of
them, are said to use their corporate law to compete for corporate tax revenue and ancil-
lary benefits . . . ."); Romano, supra note 46, at 228 (describing the assumption of race-to-
the-bottom theories that the "objective of states is revenue maximization").
48 See Hudson, supra note 43, at 380-85 (analogizing the race-to-the-bottom dynamic
to the individually rational, but collectively destructive, tragedy of the commons).
49 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics ofJurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 268 (1997);
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects of Interstate Regulatory
Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL'v REv. (SYMP. ISSUE) 149, 156 (1996). But see Romano, supra
note 46, at 226-27 ("[F]rom a firm's perspective, the benefit of a Delaware domicile,
which, in part, flows from Delaware's volume of incorporations, is notjust the guarantee of
IEW
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states compete with other states by offering laws that are more corporation
friendlyso than the laws found in other states.5 ' This may mean that they
adopt environmental laws that are less strict than the environmental laws
found in other states, or labor protections that are more permissive, thereby
reducing the costs for corporations of doing business in their states. And
while corporation-friendly laws are not per se undesirable, they may become
so if they end up crowding out other policy goals that are of equal or greater
value to citizens.
Race-to-the-bottom scholars argue that this is precisely what happens in
practice. Each state has a similar interest in attracting corporations to their
own jurisdictions and away from others, thereby creating a regulatory race, as
states constantly seek to reduce regulatory costs for corporations by creating
regulatory schemes that are ever laxer.52 The end result of this race is an
undesirable level of deregulation across a number of issue areas. Thus, per-
fectly rational state competition can lead to mutually destructive regulatory
outcomes.
The race-to-the-bottom dynamic, of course, has slightly different conno-
tations depending on the issue area, and it is perhaps worthwhile to highlight
a few variations on the concept. These variations, while not calling into ques-
tion the fundamental underpinnings of the race-to-the-bottom dynamic,
serve to demonstrate the variety of factors that influence the decision-making
processes of states.
One of the most well-known races to the bottom is found in corporate
law.5 3 The corporate law race begins with the observation that ownership of
being located in a state that is responsive to corporate desires but also access to a legal
system that reduces uncertainty concerning the consequences of actions and hence the
transaction costs of doing business.").
50 Of course, what counts as "corporation friendly" is a bit ambiguous. Corporations,
after all, are made up of a number of different constituencies, and what benefits one of
these constituencies may not benefit all of them. One prominent conflict is that between
shareholders and managers, but other conflicts exist as well-between employees and
shareholders, between directors and employees, between customers and shareholders.
This distinction can be important in determining the direction and content of the race to
the bottom, as will be described further below.
51 See Franz Xaver Perrez, The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sover-
eignty, 15 Aiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 515, 543 (1998) (noting that "by adopting a 'corpora-
tion-friendly' regulatory regime, Delaware has become the leading U.S. state of
incorporation").
52 See Swire, supra note 1, at 70-71 (arguing that the race to the bottom, as it is often
used, should more appropriately be considered a "Race to Laxity").
53 Given the importance that corporate law has played in the development of the race-
to-the-bottom literature, it should perhaps be unsurprising that the field has a number of
proponents and critics, many of whom propose slightly different versions of how the race
functions (or does not function) in practice. See Robert Anderson IV, The Delaware Trap:
An Empiical Analysis of Incorporation Decisions, 91 S. CAL.. L. REV. 657, 700-01 (2018) (argu-
ing that factors unrelated to the quality of state law strongly drive incorporation decisions);
Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C. L. REv. 1049, 1049
(2015) (arguing that "lawyers ... engag[e] in default decision making based on Delaware's
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a company is separate from control of the company.
54 Shareholders delegate
the day-to-day operations of their corporations to professional managers, and
those managers are tasked with running the company for the benefit of the
shareholders.5 5 This organizational structure, while offering important ben-
efits, creates a conflict at the heart of corporate law: managers who make
decisions for corporations may seek to run the corporation for their own
benefit, rather than for the benefit of all shareholders. Race-to-the-bottom
scholars argue that states seek to take advantage of this conflict by appealing,
not to the overall interests of corporations, but rather to the individual man-
agers that make decisions on behalf of the corporation.
5 6 These corporate
managers are themselves rational decisionmakers and, thus, should be
expected to maximize their own interests when making decisions on behalf
of the corporation.5 7 One important factor for corporate managers in decid-
ing where to incorporate (or reincorporate) is the level of protection offered
by a state's regulations.5 8 All else equal, a manager should prefer a state that
offers greater protections for managers-from, for example, fiduciary duty
lawsuits or hostile takeovers-than a state that offers fewer protections.
5
q
States, recognizing the importance of this factor in management decision-
making, compete to adopt regulatory structures that are ever more skewed in
past preeminence, rather than actively weighing" the substantive value of Delaware law);
Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1440 (arguing that state charter competition leads to a race to
the bottom on some corporate law issues, but a race to the top on others); Cary, supra note
1, at 666 (arguing that state charter competition leads to a "race for the bottom" in corpo-
rate law); John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1915, 1934 (2012) (arguing that the proliferation of state business courts cannot be justi-
fied under theories of interstate competition); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom"
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv.
913, 919-20 (1982) (arguing that state charter competition has led to a "climb to the top"
rather than a race to the bottom); Kahan & Kamar, supra note 13, at 684 (arguing that
there is no race at all because Delaware has a monopoly on corporate law).
54 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 3-5 (1932).
55 Id.
56 Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90
CALIF. L. REv. 1775, 1780 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and
Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1170
(1999). Indeed, corporate franchise taxes can make up a substantial portion of a state's
budget In 2016, Delaware's franchise taxes, entity fees, and corporate income taxes raised
$1.21 billion, accounting for an astounding thirty-one percent of the state's net budgetary
revenue. See STATE OF DEL., GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, SERIES 2017, at 46 (2017), http:/
/finance.delaware.gov/investorinfo/Series_2017_POS.pdf.
57 SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Dela-
ware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469, 469-70 (1987) (examining the role of managerial
interests in contributing to Delaware's corporate law).
58 See id. at 471 ("The principal area in which these inefficiencies [in corporate law
rules] can be expected to occur is that of rules protecting incumbent managers against the
threat of hostile takeovers.").
59 Id. at 485.
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favor of incumbent management.60 This dynamic is problematic (and thus a
race to the bottom) because it ignores the interests of shareholders.61 By
adopting excessively management-friendly laws, states deprive shareholders
of the rights and privileges that, in the absence of competition, a more effi-
cient regulatory structure would grant.62
While the corporate law race to the bottom focuses primarily on the
conflict between interest groups internal to corporations,6 3 the race to the
bottom in environmental law focuses on the conflict between internal and
external groups.64 It is well recognized that many basic environmental
goods, such as clean air, pure water, and healthy ecosystems, are true public
goods-in other words, they are nonrivalrous and nonexcludible, and one
actor's efforts to preserve and protect them provides benefits that accrue to
all other actors.65 Butjust as the benefits of environmental protection accrue
to all, so too do the harms from environmental degradation.6 6 If an actor
emits carbon in one jurisdiction that contributes to global warming, that
harm will affect not just the actor that causes the harm, and not just the
jurisdiction in which the carbon is released, but also actors and individuals
around the globe.6 7 Thus, polluting actors do not bear the full cost of their
actions, a result that can lead to excessive activity in pollution-causing indus-
tries.68 A potential solution to this problem would be to regulate environ-
mental harms so that actors are prevented from engaging in actions that are
inefficient from a collective perspective, or, similarly, to impose the full cost
60 See Bebchuk et aL., supra note 56, at 1779 ("[S]tate competition induces states to
provide rules that managers, but not necessarily shareholders, favor with respect to corpo-
rate law issues that significantly affect managers' private benefits of control, such as rules
governing takeovers."); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence ofAntitakeover Statutes on Incorpo-
ration Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1795, 1872 (2002) (concluding that "managers generally migrate to (and fail to migrate
away from) the typical state antitakeover statutes").
61 See Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 1458-84 (analyzing the ways in which the demand for
management-friendly law may lead state competition that reduces shareholder value).
62 Id. at 1483-84.
63 It should be noted that the corporate law race to the bottom has not always focused
solely on the conflict between management and ownership. Indeed, it has at times
included externalities as an important mechanism enabling the race to the bottom. See id.
at 1485-95. What is more, the conflict between ownership and management could poten-
tially be analyzed under an externalities framework. But the problems are sufficiently idio-
syncratic that it may be helpful here to review them separately.
64 See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to
the Bottom", 48 HASTINcs L.J. 271, 304-05 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, RevitalizingEnvironmental
Federalism, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 570, 627 (1996); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative
(but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
PoL'Y F. 225, 283 (1997); Swire, supra note 1, at 70.
65 See Matthew J. Kotchen, Public Goods, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE
EcONoMics: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 271, 271-73 (Timothy C. Haab & John C. Whitehead eds.,
2014); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOcY L.Q 887, 893 (1997).
66 See Esty, supra note 64, at 575-84.
67 Id. at 583-84.
68 See Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 1641, 1644 (2011).
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of an activity's harm on the actor creating it.
6 9 But states, who have substan-
tial freedom to set their own environmental policies and standards, have rea-
sons to refrain from regulating their own corporations at mutually efficient
levels. After all, if they impose fewer regulatory costs on their own corpora-
tions, their corporations will have an advantage over corporations located in
jurisdictions with higher environmental standards.
70 Adding to the problem,
states have an interest in adopting looser environmental regulations than
their neighboring states in order to attract corporations to incorporate in
their own jurisdictions.7 1 The result is that states race to adopt excessively
permissive environmental rules that ultimately harm their constituents.
72
The race to the bottom, thus, focuses heavily on federalism's capacity to
generate inefficiencies. In the corporate law context, the inefficiency derives
from the conflict of interest between management and ownership in the cor-
porate structure. In the environmental law context, the inefficiency derives
from the problem of environmental externalities, where actors do not bear
the full cost of the harms that they create. But in each case, state competi-
tion through regulation leads to inefficient rules that create a number of
69 See id. at 1694-1703.
70 See William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral Enforcement, 51
COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 360, 373-74 (2013); William Magnuson, Unilateral Corporate Regu-
lation, 17 CHI. J. INT'L L. 521, 530-31 (2017).
71 Some scholars have argued that the race to the bottom in environmental law should
be analyzed separately from the problem of externalities. See, e.g., Glicksman & Levy, supra
note 40, at 606; Revesz, supra note 2, at 1212.
72 Another mechanism contributing to the race to the bottom in environmental law is
the dispersed nature of the harm from environmental degradation and the concentrated
nature of the benefits. A firm that is operating in a carboir-intensive industry (presumably)
receives substantial benefits from engaging in the relevant activity, but the harms from the
release of carbon are spread across a large number of actors-indeed, the victims may well
include the entire population of the globe. The cost of organizing large numbers of dis-
persed actors is high, and thus local politicians may not feel strong pressure to protect
citizens (and noncitizens) from environmental harms. The beneficiaries of the activity, on
the other hand, are concentrated and are more likely to have economic interests to lobby
against environmental regulations that impose costs on their businesses. See Esty, supra
note 64, at 597-98 ("Notably, the costs of environmental regulation are generally more
concentrated and tangible than the benefits. Costs are often borne by particular industries
or enterprises, and are translated readily into monetary terms. Benefits, however, accrue
to the general public in ways that are hard to discern and monetize." (footnote omitted));
Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, "Facts Are Stubborn Things": An Empirical Reality Check in
the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CoR-
NELL J.L. & PuB. Pot'v 55, 64 (1998) ("According to the economic theory of regulation,
laws tend to respond to the wants of small, cohesive special interest groups, such as indus-
try, at the expense of the wants of the larger, more diffuse public. The public, which is the
intended beneficiary of stringent regulation, is often in a weaker political position than
industry, which is the primary beneficiary of less regulation." (footnote omitted)); see also
Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protection, 24 HARv. J.L. &
PuB. Pot'Y 653, 665-66 (2001); Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political
Externalities: The Political Economy ofEnvironmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REv. 845,
918-20 (1999).
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pathologies in a federalist system. In seeking to win favor with corporations
by adopting ever looser regulatory structures that distinguish themselves
from other jurisdictions, states engage in an ultimately self-destructive drive
toward extreme deregulation. Thus, in the views of race-to-the-bottom schol-
ars, federalism tends to lower the quality of state law.
C. The Race to the Top
While race-to-the-bottom scholars argue that federalism encourages
states to engage in destructive competition that leads to inefficient law, race-
to-the-top scholars argue the opposite-that it leads states toward better regu-
latory structures.73 Rather than forcing states to eliminate efficient regula-
tion, competition creates strong incentives for states to adopt regulations that
balance the interests of all actors, thereby leading to more efficient social
outcomes. Under race-to-the-top theories of constitutional structure, then,
federalism spurs regulatory efficiency by increasing the benefits of marginal
improvements in state law.
Just like the race to the bottom, the race-to-the-top dynamic begins with
the assumption that states seek to attract corporations to their states. But
while the race-to-the-bottom dynamic focuses on the presence of market fail-
ures (such as conflicts of interest or externalities), the race-to-the-top
dynamic focuses on the power of market efficiencies.74 Well-functioning
markets, after all, should lead to efficient allocations of resources.75 In the
absence of disabling externalities or some other noncorrectable market fail-
ure, both consumers and suppliers of a product should gain from
competition.7 6
The race-to-the-top literature argues that markets for regulation work
similarly to markets for any other type of good. Corporations benefit, not
from the absence of regulation, but rather from good regulation.7 7 If a food
company relocates to a jurisdiction that has no health and safety codes, it
might reduce its short-term costs, but it also sends a powerful signal to con-
sumers about the quality of the company's products. If a technology com-
pany moves to ajurisdiction that provides for no liability for data breaches, it
73 As mentioned above, the term "race to the top" is also at times used to describe the
phenomenon of state competition leading to stricter regulation, rather than more efficient
regulation. See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 2, at 258-59; Bradford, supra note 7, at 5. While
this Section will focus primarily on the literature on the race to efficiency, it will also briefly
discuss the dynamics of this alternative view of races to the top.
74 See Winter, supra note 2, at 260.
75 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Allocation Role of the Stock Market: Pareto Optimality and Competi-
tion, 36J. FIN. 235, 235 (1981).
76 Id.
77 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers'Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evi-
dence, 9 DEL. . CoRp. L. 540, 571 (1984); Fischel, supra note 53, at 919-20; Winter, supra
note 2, at 256; see also Summer Kim, Corporate LongArms, 50 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1067, 1108 (2018)
(arguing that corporate long-arm statutes can be used to overcome the dynamics that push
states toward a race to the bottom).
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might reduce its exposure to lawsuits, but it would also provide users with
important information about the company's priorities. Thus, while the race-
to-the-bottom dynamic assumes that regulatory competition between states
will inevitably lead to excessive deregulation because of the pathologies of
corporate decisionmaking, the race-to-the-top dynamic argues that these
pathologies are less powerful than many believe.
78 As a result, in a truly com--
petitive market, efficient regulation will tend to attract corporations more
than lack of regulation. States, recognizing this fact, attempt to distinguish
themselves by providing ever more effective regulatory regimes.
7 9
Take, for example, the case of corporate law. Race-to-the-top scholars
argue that the race-to-the-bottom theory fundamentally misunderstands how
corporate decisionmaking works.
8 0 While it may be true that corporate man-
agers prefer in the abstract to locate their corporations in jurisdictions that
provide high levels of protection for incumbent managers, shareholders do
not share this preference.
8 ' If a corporation reincorporates into an exces-
sively management-friendly jurisdiction, shareholders will rationally view this
decision as indicative of the corporation's risks and benefits.
82 Corporations
based in excessively management-friendly jurisdictions will find it more diffi-
cult to raise money in the capital markets (at least from shareholders), their
stock prices may decline, and they may become more vulnerable to takeover
attempts.8 3 Thus, corporations should not systematically demand more man-
agement-friendly corporate laws from states. Instead, they should seek states
with strong, well-designed shareholder-protection regimes.
8 4 These jurisdic-
tions will be able to provide greater certainty to investors about their rights
and privileges, and thus should allow corporations to have a competitive
advantage in the capital markets.
8 5 Indeed, it has long been recognized that
one way that corporations can improve their reputations with investors and
lenders is to "bond" themselves to jurisdictions with strong corporate-govern-
ance standards.8 6 This has been a standard explanation for why interna-
78 Winter, supra note 2, at 256-58.
79 Id. at 256.
80 See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Com-
petition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259, 260-61 (1980); Easterbrook, supra note 77,
at 549-50; Fischel, supra note 53, at 920-21; Winter, supra note 2, at 256.
81 See Fischel, supra note 53, at 918-19.
82 Id. at 919-20.
83 Id. at 919.
84 Id. at 919-20.
85 Id.
86 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. Rv. 1757, 1830
(2002) [hereinafter Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?] ("Cross-listing may in part be . . . a
bonding mechanism to assure public investors that they will not be exploited . . . ."); John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 691-92 (1999) [hereinafter Coffee, The Future as
History] ("The simplest explanation for the migration of foreign issuers to U.S. exchanges
and NASDAQ is that such a listing is a form of bonding . . . .").
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tional corporations often list their stock on U.S. stock exchanges-by doing
so, they signal to the international capital markets that they are committed to
running their businesses properly.87 Concomitantly, states benefit from high
corporate law standards that provide strong protections for shareholders and
prevent management overreaching. Regulatory competition in corporate
law, then, is driven by states constantly seeking to distinguish themselves from
other states through ever more effective shareholder-protection rules.
Similarly, race-to-the-top scholars argue that federalism creates incen-
tives for states to improve their environmental regulations. While critics of
environmental federalism worry that states will lower environmental stan-
dards in order to give their corporations a competitive advantage, race-to-the-
top theorists argue that environmental problems are often best dealt with at
the local level. Local governments are more attuned to the desires of their
voters, they have better knowledge about the kinds of environmental
problems that affect their regions, and they are more willing to experiment
to discover new solutions to old environmental problems.8 8 Far from being
unwilling to address environmental issues, state governments actively seek to
enact laws that reflect the environmental preferences of their constituents.
After all, while a corporation may have a strict firm-level preference for lower
environmental regulations, to the extent that the corporation's employees or
shareholders are located within a state, their preferences may override the
firm-level preference. Indeed, it is not uncommon for state-level environ-
mental protections to be more stringent than national-level protections,89 not
less, a fact that race-to-the-top theorists view as strong evidence that environ-
mental federalism does not lead to a race to the bottom.9 0 The mechanisms
driving this development include legislative responsiveness to the environ-
mental concerns of their constituents, general state interests in improving
the state's national reputation, and a more economically driven desire to give
87 Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?, supra note 86; Coffee, The Future as History, supra
note 86.
88 See ALEXANDER VOLOKH ET AL., REASON PUB. POLICY INST. & NAT'L ENvTL. PoIcY
INST., RACE TO THE Top: THE INNOVATIVE FACE OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
(1998); Adler, supra note 2, at 89; Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of
Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 108-14 (2007);
Revesz, supra note 2, at 1212; Wallace E. Oates, On Environmental Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1321, 1322 (1997) ("Competition among governments, like competition in the private sec-
tor, embodies incentives that point public officials in the right direction.").
89 See, e.g., Brady Dennis &Juliet Eilperin, States Aren't Waitingfor the Trump Administra-
tion on Environmental Protections, WASH. POST (May 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/national/health-science/states-arent-waiting-for-the-trump-administration-on-envi-
ronmental-protections/2019/05/19/5dc853fc-7722-1 1e9-b3f5-5673edf2dl27-story.html.
90 But see Revesz, supra note 2, at 1229 (arguing that the "proliferation of more strin-
gent state [environmental] standards is not necessarily inconsistent with the race to the
bottom").
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in-state corporations an early-adopter advantage in future environmental
schemes and regulations.9 1
Regardless of the particular mechanisms driving regulatory competition,
race-to-the-top scholars agree that federalism should be expected to lead to
better law. By giving both corporations and citizens options about where to
locate, federalism forces states to compete for their loyalties. They do so by
improving the quality of their laws and regulations in order to create the
conditions for thriving local communities, businesses, and governments.
II. THE RACE TO THE MIDDLE
The race to the top and the race to the bottom provide starkly different
visions of federalism as a constitutional doctrine. Race-to-the-bottom schol-
ars argue that federalism leads states to adopt inefficient regulatory struc-
tures in order to appeal to powerful interest groups.
9 2 Race-to-the-top
scholars, on the other hand, hold that federalism leads states to progressively
improve their regulatory structures in order to create better conditions for
their citizens.9 3 Despite the substantial conflict between the conclusions that
these two theories reach, however, both models of federalism share a basic
assumption-that federalism leads states to differentiate themselves from
other states. In the race-to-the-bottom model of federalism, states seek to
make their corporate laws more management friendly or their environmental
laws less burdensome than the relevant laws in other jurisdictions. In the race-
to-the-top model of federalism, states seek to make their corporate laws better
balanced or their environmental laws more attuned to the interests of their citi-
zens than the relevant laws in other jurisdictions. In other words, both the
race-to-the-bottom and race-to-the-top theories posit that regulatory competi-
tion leads to increasingly extreme (in the case of the race to the bottom,
extremely inefficient; in the case of the race to the top, extremely efficient)
regulatory schemes.
But, as this Part will argue, states often have interests that push them in a
different direction-to the middle. Rather than differentiating their regula-
tory structures from other states, states often seek to assimilate their laws to
the laws of other jurisdictions. This race to the middle pushes states to adopt
laws that are similar or identical to the laws in place in a sufficiently large
number of other jurisdictions. They do so in response to the informational
benefits that accrue to states that adopt well-established legal regimes, the
demand by constituents for familiar regulatory regimes, the network effects
that are generated from interoperable regulatory structures, and the reduced
91 See VOGEL, supra note 2, at 259; J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of
Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. RIEv. 1499, 1519 (2007); Kirsten
H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2
HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 119, 134 (2008); Lesley K. McAllister, Regional Climate Regulation:
From State Competition to State Collaboration, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 81, 87
(2009).
92 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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risk of federal intervention that arises when states adopt mainstream regula-
tory structures. These powerful state interests are underappreciated by the
"race-to-the-extreme" theories of regulatory competition that are prevalent
today.
The presence of a race-to-the-middle dynamic in state competition does
not, however, eliminate the possibility that states will race to the extremes in
other issue areas. The race to the middle is dependent on a set of specific
conditions that will not be present in all circumstances. This Part will outline
these conditions and conclude by suggesting that the race to the middle pro-
vides a strong counterdynamic to race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom
models of federalism.
A. The Benefits of the Middle
Under a race-to-the-middle dynamic, states seek to adopt regulatory
structures that are similar or identical to the regulatory structures already in
place in a substantial portion of other states. As opposed to the race to the
top and the race to the bottom, which tend to drive overall regulatory quality
toward ever greater levels of efficiency or inefficiency, the primary effect of
the race to the middle is to reduce the overall variation in the quality and
content of substantive law. This Section will argue that states have strong
interests in adopting laws that mirror those in place in other states, irrespec-
tive of the independent desirability of those laws. In particular, racing to the
middle offers four primary benefits to states. First, states benefit from a num-
ber of informational effects when they adopt legal regimes that are well estab-
lished and widely prevalent. Second, corporations and firms have strong
interests in seeking out, and locating themselves in, jurisdictions that have
familiar legal structures. Third, adopting a widely prevalent legal structure
provides a set of interoperability benefits for both corporations and firms.
And fourth, the risk of federal intervention is lower when states have legal
structures well within the norms of other state behavior.
1. Informational Effects
States adopt laws for many reasons, but one of the most important ones
is to guide and constrain the behavior of their citizens.94 They pass laws out-
94 See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 148 (1986) (recognizing the pragmatist
view that laws should generally be enforced in accordance with their plain meaning
because "[o]therwise government would lose its power to control people's behavior, and
this would obviously make the community as a whole worse off'); H.L.A. HART, THE CON-
CEPT OF LAw 116 (3d ed. 2012) ("There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary
and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand, those rules of beha-
viour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be gener-
ally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal
validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common
public standards of official behaviour by its officials."); Joseph Raz, The Identity of Legal
Systems, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 802 (1971), reprinted inJOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAw:
EssAys ON LAW AND MORALITY 78, 86 (2d ed. 2009) ("Laws guide human behaviour, help
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lawing murder because they want to deter their citizens from killing one
another and to punish those who do. They pass laws outlawing drunk driving
because they want to stop their citizens from endangering others and to
remove those who do from the streets. But of course, states face substantial
uncertainty about whether their laws will in fact change behaviors in the way
they desire.9 5 Laws protecting disabled workers from being fired may lead to
employers refusing to hire them in the first place.
96 Laws protecting the hab-
itats of endangered species may lead to landowners destroying those habitats
before the endangered species arrive.9 7 Uncertainty about the effects of reg-
ulation on behavior can be costly for states because it may lead them to enact
ineffective laws or delay beneficial regulation.
States that adopt a race-to-the-middle strategy can reduce these uncer-
tainties by enacting laws that other states have already adopted. By doing so,
they gain significant information on how their chosen legal structures work,
or at least how they work in other places.
98 This benefit of the "middle"
strategy, while perhaps obvious, should not be underestimated.
99 Legislation
creates a number of risks and uncertainties for states. The statute may con-
tain errors or oversights that undermine the purposes of its drafters.
10 0
Judges may fail to interpret the law in a way that legislators expect.
01 Private
parties may respond to the law in unpredictable ways.'
0 2 By adopting legisla-
people in planning and deciding on their future course of action, and provide standards
for evaluating past or planned actions.").
95 See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1390, 1390 (1994) ("It is a familiar point that government regulation that is amply justified
in principle may go terribly wrong in practice.").
96 See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The
Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. EcoN. 915, 917 (2001).
97 See Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the Endan-
gered Species Act, 46 J.L. & EcoN. 27, 27 (2003).
98 See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMIPARATIVE LAW (2d
ed. 1993); William Ewald, Comparative jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43
AM. J. Comp. L. 489 (1995); Vlad Perju, Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing, and Migrations,
in THE OxFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1305 (Michel Rosenfeld
& Andrits Saj6 eds., 2012).
99 Of course, the fact that many other states have adopted the legal regime in question
might also send a signal to other states about the quality of that law. See RobertJ. Shiller,
Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior, 85 AM. EcoN. REv. 181 (1995) (examining how
herd behavior may result from information discovery by others). Thus, the very existence
of a middle might suggest that the middle is (relatively) efficient-after all, a significant
number of other states decided to adopt the structure and stay with it. But this conclusion
is questionable for a number of reasons, as further explored in Part III.
100 For a discussion of the effect of legislative errors, see Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scriv-
ener's Error, 110 Nw. U. L. REV. 811 (2016).
101 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2387 (2003);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405 (1989).
102 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharaoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of
Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEx. L. REV. 753, 753 (1995) (arguing that legislation aimed at
"mandatory disclosure will have the opposite of its intended effect"); Sunstein, supra note
95, at 1391.
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tion that is closely correlated with preexisting and prevalent legislation else-
where, states can minimize the risks of unintended consequences.
One important informational benefit of shifting to the middle is the
ability to learn from past mistakes. The learning benefits of legislation can
be large. For example, when states were considering minimum-wage laws in
the last few decades, one important question was whether instituting a state
minimum wage would reduce employment."u Economic theory has long
suggested that it would, based on simple rules of supply and demand-as the
price of labor increases, demand for it should decrease.'0 But after several
states adopted higher minimum-wage laws, studies found that the rules did
not lead to a decrease in employment, at least when the increase was not
excessive.0 5 These results provided important information to other states
about the effects of minimum-wage laws and thus allowed them to make
more informed decisions when deciding whether to adopt similar laws.
The informational benefits of the "middle" are consistent with the sub-
stantial economic literature demonstrating a second-mover advantage in cer-
tain markets.0 6 The fundamental insight of this literature is that, while it is
sometimes beneficial to be the first company or firm to innovate (the "first-
mover advantage"), it is often even better to allow one's competitors to inno-
vate and then enter the market afterward (the "second-mover advan-
tage").10 7 Innovating is costly and risky, as it requires substantial research
103 For a summary of the debate, see David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum
Wages and Low-Wage Workers: How Well Does Reality Match the Rhetoric?, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1296
(2008).
104 See Mark G. Kelman, Progressive Vacuums, 48 STAN. L. REv. 975, 981 (1996) (book
review) ("Mainstream economists are, with very few exceptions, quite hostile to minimum
wage laws."); John M. Peterson, Employment Effects of Minimum Wages, 1938-50, 65 J. POL.
EcoN. 412, 413 (1957) ("The competitive model of the firm, which assumes a horizontal
labor-supply curve and a smoothly declining labor-demand curve, implies than an imposed
wage increase, other things remaining the same, will reduce employment and reduce it
more, the larger the wage increase."); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage
Legislation, 36 AM. EcoN. REv. 358, 361 (1946) ("[T]he net effects of the minimum wage on
aggregate employment are adverse.").
105 See David Card, Do Minimum Wages Reduce Employment? A Case Study of California,
1987-89, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 38, 38 (1992); David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Mini-
mum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772, 792 (1994); Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Kreuger, The Effect
of the Minimum Wage on the Fast Food Industry, 46 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 6, 6 (1992). But see
David Neumark, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Employment, FED. REs. BANK S.F. (Dec. 21,
2015), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2015/
december/effects-of-minimum-wage-on-employment/ (summarizing the results of numer-
ous minimum-wage studies and concluding that the evidence is "conflicting").
106 See, e.g., STEVEN P. SCHNAARS, MANAGING IMITATION STRATEGIES 29-30 (1994);Joseph
Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. EcoN.
70, 75-79 (1985); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REv. 257, 268-70 (2007).
107 See Michael Kopel & Clemens L6ffler, Commitment, First-Mover-, and Second-Mover
Advantage, 94 J. EcoN. 143 (2008); Fernando Suarez & Gianvito Lanzolla, The Half-Truth of
First-Mover Advantage, HARV. Bus. REv., Apr. 2005, at 121.
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and effort ex ante and it is unclear whether sufficient demand ex post will
offset the upfront costs.'0 8 Furthermore, if other actors can enter the market
at lower costs after the first mover has created the product and proven the
viability of the strategy, the "second movers" may have an advantage over the
first movers because they have avoided the substantial upfront costs.
109
Similarly, states that are seeking to reform their laws have the option of
attempting to innovate (that is, create new rules or laws that have little prece-
dent) or copy (that is, adopt the rules or laws that other states have adopted).
The benefit of being a second mover here is that states avoid the cost of
surveying citizens to identify voter preferences, contacting companies to
determine the effects of the new law on business, and otherwise researching
the innumerable effects of new regulatory schemes. Instead, they have a sim-
ple and reliable model that has been proven and tested in other states.
Indeed, the second-mover advantage is likely even stronger in the regulatory
sphere than in private markets, given that the precise structure of a given
regulatory scheme-that is, its legislative text-is publicly available, while the
production methods for new products tend to be privately held trade secrets
that are closely guarded.'10
Thus, one important benefit to states of shifting regulation to the mid-
dle, rather than the bottom or the top, is that doing so provides a set of
valuable informational benefits to the legislating state.'' It reduces uncer-
tainty by allowing the state to observe the effects of the chosen regulatory
structure in other circumstances. It prevents legislative mistakes by allowing
the state to exploit the learning benefits of other states. And it minimizes
transaction costs by allowing the state to take advantage of well-established
structures that have already been tested by other states. Thus, from the sup-
ply-side perspective of regulation, racing to the middle creates a set of bene-
fits for the states that decide to adopt the strategy.
108 See F.M. SCHERER, NEW PERSPECTrVES ON EcoNoMIC GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION 53-88 (1999); Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition:
Lessons from Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 541, 545 (1995) (arguing that
since "[i]ndividual states have a reduced incentive to solve problems of corporate govern-
ance because successful statutory solutions may be quickly copied by rival jurisdictions ... ,
even if state legislatures are engaged in a race-to-the-top with respect to the creation of
corporate law, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect that the race will not proceed
at an efficiently fast pace"); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the
Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1018 (2014).
109 See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REv. 697, 708-09 (2001).
110 See id.
111 But see Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatoy Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1672 (2014)
(arguing that an "information deficit" at the state level both "limits the experimental
upside of laboratories-the efficient, effective, and innovative approaches that can emerge
from experimentation-and expands the known downside of federalism: the costs to pri-
vate actors of identifying and ensuring compliance with fifty or more different standards").
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2. Familiarity
But if the race to the middle only provided benefits to the suppliers of law
(that is, legislatures), and failed to provide clear benefits to the consumers of
that law (that is, citizens, firms, corporations, and other groups), it is unclear
that the race to the middle could overcome the countervailing pressures of
interest groups. After all, even the most pessimistic theories of regulatory
competition assume that legislatures are responsive to the interests and
desires of some of their constituents, even if they do not accurately represent
the interests of society more broadly. Thus, it is not enough that state legisla-
tors benefit from racing to the middle-for the race to the middle to prove
enduring, it must also provide benefits to constituents. For simplicity's sake,
this subsection will focus on the interests of firms and companies generally,
as this is the group at the center of most theories of regulatory competition,
but it is worth noting that many of these arguments apply with equal vigor to
ordinary individuals as well.
One important benefit to corporations of operating within a state that
has adopted a "middle" regulatory structure is that the operative structure is
familiar to them." 2 Corporations, and corporate executives acting on their
behalf, seek to avoid uncertain regulatory environments.'13 Uncertain or
vague laws make for bad business environments, environments where benefi-
cial transactions are more costly due to the lack of certainty over the legal
treatment of transactions.11 4 In order to avoid these costs, corporations have
an interest in seeking out familiar regulatory structures, and the race to the
middle helps provide these to them.
There are strong rational choice reasons that underlie this preference
for familiarity. A number of studies have shown, for example, that when
firms face uncertain regulatory environments, they will take otherwise ineffi-
cient actions in order to offset this uncertainty.'15 For example, they tend to
112 See Brian J. Broughman & Darian M. Ibrahim, Delaware's Familiarity, 52 SAN DIECO L.
REV. 273, 276 (2015) (arguing that "while Delaware may have begun its ascent to the top of
the corporate law hierarchy by offering more desirable law than its leading competitor, it
stays there as much because it is familiar to business parties as for its substantive virtues"
(footnote omitted));Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California's "Women
on Board"' Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition, 20 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 493
(2019) (arguing that the internal affairs doctrine has led to less variation in corporate law
than in Europe); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO
L. REV. 709, 736 (1987) ("One factor that transaction cost economics emphasizes is that
reducing uncertainty reduces the cost of doing business.").
113 See Anna Gelpern et al., If Boilerplate Could Talk: The Work of Standard Terms in Sover-
eign Bond Contracts, 44 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 617 (2019) (describing the preferences of sover-
eign bond markets for "market standard" terms in contracts); Romano, supra note 46, at
274 ("These features of stability and predictability are desired by managers who need quick
opinions on proposed activities.").
114 See Romano, supra note 46, at 275.
115 See, e.g., THOMAS TRAUTMANN, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS UNDER RECU-
LATORY UNCERTAINIY: AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE RESPONSES TO REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY
IN THE EUROPEAN EMISSION TRADING SCHEME (2007); Philip H. Birnbaum, The Choice of
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postpone large strategic decisions."6 They tend to decrease their invest-
ments in long-term projects.'17 And they tend to reduce risky expenditures
on research and development into new products."8 What is more, regula-
tory uncertainty is particularly pronounced when new rules are in the process
of being formulated and enacted.19 All of these considerations suggest that
corporations will, all else equal, prefer jurisdictions with familiar legal
regimes over ones with unfamiliar regimes.
But in addition to rational economic reasons for preferring familiar,
"middle" regulatory structures, there are also behavioral biases that contrib-
ute to the preference. For example, studies have repeatedly shown that indi-
vidual decisionmaking is skewed by the so-called "endowment effect," under
which individuals value the items they currently possess more highly than the
items they do not possess.120 The endowment effect makes it less likely that
individuals will be willing to abandon current arrangements in favor of other,
rationally more beneficial arrangements. Similarly, individuals suffer from
"status quo biases," under which they strongly prefer to maintain their cur-
rent state of affairs rather than change to alternative ones.
12 ' The status quo
bias has been demonstrated to have substantial effects on important financial
decisions, including health plans and retirement programs.1
22 Finally, when
individuals are faced complex problems, they tend to resort to heuristics to
resolve them.1 23 Rather than attempt to maximize their interests, they
Strategic Alternatives Under Increasing Regulation in High Technology Companies, 27 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 489 (1984); David L. Levy, Business and International Environmental Treaties: Ozone
Depletion and Climate Change, CAL. MGMT. REv., Spring 1997, at 54.
116 See Christian Engau & Volker H. Hoffman, Strategizing in an Unpredictable Climate:
Exploring Corporate Strategies to Cope with Regulatory Uncertainty, 44 LONG RANGE PLAN. 42, 44
(2011).
117 See Ben S. Bernanke, Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment, 98 Q.J. EcoN.
85, 85 (1983) (concluding that "[i]n an environment in which the underlying stochastic
structure is itself subject to random change, events whose long-run implications are uncer-
tain can create an investment cycle by temporarily increasing the returns to waiting for
information"); George Bittlingmayer, Regulatory Uncertainty and Investment: Evidence from
Antitrust Enforcement, 20 CATO J. 295, 295-96 (2001); Nick Bloom et al., Uncertainty and
Investment Dynamics, 74 REv. EcON. STUD. 391, 391 (2007); Alex Cukierman, The Effects of
Uncertainty on Investment Under Risk Neutrality with Endogenous Information, 88 J. POL. EcoN.
462, 462 (1980).
118 See Birnbaum, supra note 115, at 496.
119 Barbara Farnham, Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 25
POL. PSYCHOL. 441, 454 (2004); David P. McCaffrey, Corporate Resources and Regulatory Pres-
sures: Toward Explaining a Discrepancy, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 398, 404 (1982).
120 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98J. POL. EcoN. 1325, 1325 (1990); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF.
L. REv. 1051, 1107-13 (2000).
121 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 194; William Samuelson & Richard
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 7-8 (1988).
122 See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 121, at 7.
123 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 120, at 1075-1102.
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instead tend to "satisfice," that is, opt for the most readily available choice
that is sufficiently beneficial to meet their basic requirements.1 2" Satisficing,
of course, may not be fully irrational if the cost of acquiring the additional
information necessary to make a maximizing decision is prohibitive, but it
does suggest that corporate managers will favor familiar regulatory structures
that have worked before.125 All of these biases suggest that, even if there are
sound reasons for corporations to prefer new regimes that offer benefits over
older ones, corporations may still opt for more familiar regimes out of irra-
tional behavioral biases.
This preference for familiarity in the corporate context is aptly demon-
strated by a now-famous puzzle of start-up and venture capitalist strategy.
When venture capitalists invest in start-ups, they generally demand that the
start-up become a "C corporation," a particular kind of corporation that
imposes a double-taxation penalty on investors, with the firm paying taxes on
its income once at an entity level and then the investors paying tax again
when the profits are distributed to them.12 6 This decision is normally justi-
fied by a combination of arguments related to tax-exempt investors, initial
public offering rules, and the ability to offer stock options.127 But in recent
years, a number of tax scholars have demonstrated that there is a more
favorable tax structure for start-ups that meets these basic requirements and
also prevents double taxation-the limited liability company, or LLC. 1 2 8 Sev-
eral studies have demonstrated that venture capitalists, by utilizing the more
favorable research and development deductions of LLCs, could increase
returns to investors by over five percent.1 29 Despite the seemingly over-
whelming evidence in favor of this new structure, however, the C-corporation
structure continues to predominate.1 3 0 One important reason, many theo-
rists suggest, is that the C-corporation structure is now so familiar to practi-
tioners, including the lawyers and investors that draft and execute investment
documents, that they are psychologically and professionally committed to the
structure despite potential benefits of other structures.'13
124 See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, at xxix (3d ed. 1976) ("Whereas
economic man maximizes-selects the best alternative from among all those available to
him, his cousin, administrative man, satisfices-looks for a course of action that is satisfac-
tory or 'good enough.'"); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 215 (1995).
125 See GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69J. POL. EcoN. 213, 213 (1961).
126 See Calvin H. Johnson, Why Do Venture Capital Funds Burn Research and Development
Deductions?, 29 VA. TAX REV. 29 (2009); EricJ. Allen et al., On the Tax Efficiency of Startup
Firms (May 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3069256.
127 SeeJohnson, supra note 126, at 31-34.
128 See Allen et al., supra note 126, at 1.
129 See id. at 2.
130 Id. at 1.
131 The cost of switching to a new structure is, of course, not just psychological. The
cost of drafting new form documents, analyzing the legal validity of these documents, and
reaching agreement with stakeholders on the proper content of the documents could be
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Finally, familiarity also provides benefits to third parties. When a com-
pany is considering doing business with another company, it needs to know,
at least in general terms, how the other company operates.
132 For example,
it will want to know that its executive has authority to enter into contracts,
that its limited-liability rules are the same, and that it is subject to the same
types of bankruptcy rules.1 33 But if the other company is subject to an
entirely different legal regime, the costs of doing business with it rise expo-
nentially.134 How can the out-of-state company be assured that the company
will meet its obligations? It would need to do substantial research on the
state law or hire a local lawyer to delve into the differences. If instead, the
state has adopted wholesale the majority law for these areas, then the out-of-
state company can be reasonably assured that it knows the rules of the road.
All of this is not to suggest that corporations have no interest in the
substance and content of laws-they certainly do. It is also not to suggest
that corporate executives are unconcerned with the laws that govern them-
they certainly are.13 5 But rather it is to suggest that one important compo-
nent of law, and one that corporations and corporate executives care deeply
about, is familiarity. All else equal, corporations and their decisionmakers
prefer regulatory structures that resemble the regulatory structures they have
dealt with in other jurisdictions. This preference is deeply rooted, through
internal and external causes, and creates a strong reason for corporations to
gravitate toward middle jurisdictions, as opposed to bottom or top jurisdic-
tions that have new or different laws. The question then becomes how much
weight corporations give to familiarity as an independent value of law, as
opposed to the weight they give to other features of law.
3. Interoperability
While states benefit from the greater informational effects of middle reg-
ulatory structures, and corporations benefit from the greater familiarity of
those structures, both groups benefit from another important feature of the
middle: greater interoperability. In many cases, legal structures grow increas-
high. But again, this suggests even more potently the strong forces pushing corporations
and other commercial entities toward the familiar, middle regulatory structure.
132 See generally Lou R. KLING & EILEEN NUGENT SIMON, NEGOTIATED AcQUISITIONS OF
COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVIsIONs § 8.02, Lexis (database updated June 2019) (dis-
cussing the typical due-diligence requirements in an acquisition).
133 Id.
134 See Gilles Cuniberti, Is the CISG Benefiting Anybody?, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1511,
1513-17 (2006).
135 In some cases, these interests may well override any interest in familiarity. See, e.g.,
Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explana-
tion for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARv. L. REV. 874, 881 (2003) ("[T]he power of stand-
ardization should not be overstated, since parties [can and] will depart from market
practice when a departure is profitable enough to overcome the information costs they will
incur.").
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ingly effective and efficient as more jurisdictions adopt them.' 3 6 The inter-
operability effect of regulation can create strong pressures for states to adopt
laws that resemble those of their neighbors.
Interoperability generally refers to the ability of two rules or systems to
interact seamlessly with one another.' 17 Take the paradigmatic example of
train tracks.i 8 If one state adopts a law that all train tracks must be of a
certain size or "gauge," and a neighboring state adopts a law requiring train
tracks to be of a different gauge, the result will be a system with low inter-
operability, one that is rife with transaction costs: trains will not be able to
run across state lines, goods that cross borders will need to be unloaded and
reloaded onto different trains, and train travel will be significantly more
expensive and time consuming.13 9 But if the two states adopt the same law,
requiring train tracks to be of the same gauge, both sides will benefit: the
dead weight loss of transaction costs is eliminated and both sides should
receive the advantage of seamless travel from one state to the other, regard-
less of the relative distribution of train companies, shippers, and travelers in
the two states.
Interoperability effects provide a strong reason for states to adopt laws
similar to those of their neighbors. Regardless of whether states prefer laxer
or stricter regulations, they have a separate and independent interest in elim-
inating wasteful or burdensome regulation.'o This interest is mirrored by
the interest of corporations in standardization and the elimination of bureau-
cratic costs.1 4 1 Indeed, corporations have a long history of lobbying govern-
ments to adopt more standardized regulations among themselves.1 42 In
recent years, the financial technology industry has pressed states to stream-
line their conflicting regulations on financial technology licenses, and in
136 There is a large literature describing the benefits (and costs) of standardization in
markets. See, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. EcoN. REV. 332,
335 (1985); Farrell & Saloner, supra note 106, at 70-71; Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 479, 516 (1998).
137 See Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking Anticircumvention's Interoperability Policy, 42 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 1549, 1554-57 (2009).
138 See generally Douglas J. Puffert, The Standardization of Track Gauge on North American
Railways, 1830-1890, 60 J. EcoN. HisT. 933 (2000); Daniel P. Gross, The Ties That Bind:
Railroad Gauge Standards, Collusion, and Internal Trade in the 19th Century U.S. (Harvard Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. 17-044, 2016).
139 This was in fact the case in the United States in the early 1800s. Although railroad
gauges were not regulated by states, individual railways chose the gauge that they would
use on their own railroads, and this led to a wide variety in the standards and sizes of rails.
See Puffert, supra note 138, at 933. The lack of standardization became such a problem
that a term was developed for it: "breaks of gauge" referred to the common problem of two
railroads of different gauge meeting. Id.
140 But see Finer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35-44 (1991) (describing the interest group theory of politics).
141 See, e.g., Magnuson, Unilateral Corporate Regulation, supra note 70, at 551-52.
142 See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Danny Hakim, Lobbying Bonanza as Firms Try to Influence Euro-
pean Union, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/world/
europe/lobbying-bonanza-as-firms-try-to-influence-european-union.h tml.
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2018, a group of seven state banking regulators announced that they would
cooperate to harmonize their processes.4 3 Rideshare companies like Uber
and Lyft have lobbied state legislatures to pass comprehensive transport regu-
lation that would eliminate the patchwork of conflicting regulations in place
in different jurisdictions. 1 4 4 Corporations have lobbied state governments to
adopt more harmonized labor laws governing their treatment of workers in
order to avoid the cost of enacting different internal policies in different
states.145 And of course, one of the most successful state harmonization
efforts, and one that was widely supported by business, was the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, which has now been adopted by all states in one form or
another, and which harmonizes state rules governing commercial
transactions.14
6
The interoperability of regulations has particular importance in areas
where markets naturally or necessarily have interjurisdictional reach. One
prominent example of this is the energy market, and in particular, the renew-
able energy market. Because the sources of renewable energy (solar, wind,
and others) are available in different amounts at different times in different
states, it is generally efficient for companies to both harvest and sell energy
across borders.14 7 But if every state adopted different substantive require-
ments for energy provision in its own jurisdiction, the ability of companies to
operate across states would be severely impaired. States, recognizing this,
have rushed to adopt startlingly similar renewable energy regulations. In par-
ticular, they have coalesced around a program known as a "renewable portfo-
lio standard," which requires electric utilities to produce a certain percentage
of their electricity from renewable energy sources. 
1 4 8 Thirty-nine states have
143 See Lalita Clozel, Seven States Team Up on Fintech Licenses, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/seven-states-team-up-on-fintech-licenses-1517923800.
144 See Liam Dillon, Bill Would Let Uber, Lyft Drivers Get a Single California Business License
Rather than Multiple Local Ones, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/polit-
ics/la-pol-ca-uber-license-fees-20170802-story.html; Ken Lovett, Uber, Lyft Spent Nearly $1M
on NYS Lobbying So Far in 2016, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.nydailynews
.com/news/politics/uber-lyft-spent-lm-nys-lobbying-2016-article-1.2741680; Kimberly
Reeves, As Texas Lawmakers Consider Statewide Ridesharing Rules, Lobbying Efforts Go into Over-
drive, AuSTIN Bus.J. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/austin/news/
2017/0 3 /
15/as-texas-lawmakers-consider-statewide-ridesharing.html.
145 See Walter Kolvenbach, EEC Company Law Harmonization and Worker Participation, 11
U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 709, 709 (1990).
146 See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM.
L. REv. 798, 798 (1958); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform
Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 84 (1993);
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), DuKE U. SCH. L., https://web.law.duke.edu/lib/
researchguides/ucc/ (last updated Dec. 2016).
147 See generally PAUL W. PARFOMAK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44747, CROSS-BOR-
DER ENERGY TRADE IN NORTH AMERICA: PRESENT AND POTENTIAL (2017).
148 SeeJoshua P. Fershee, Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking Energy Policy
Based on a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 1414 (2010); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy
Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1621, 1624-25 (2015); Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1428-29 (2010).
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now adopted renewable portfolio standards, a remarkable level of uniformity,
given that twenty-five years ago, only two states had them.'49
Importantly, both the race to the top and the race to the bottom greatly
reduce the potential for interoperability benefits among states. If states con-
sistently seek to distinguish themselves by enacting ever stricter or laxer rules,
businesses will struggle to operate seamlessly across borders. Different or
varying standards in state law raise the cost of business for corporations that
operate in interjurisdictional markets. The race to the middle, on the other
hand, helps obviate these problems.
Interoperability effects are only strengthened when they overlap with
network effects.1 50 Network effects, also sometimes referred to as network
externalities, are the benefits that accrue to consumers as more consumers
adopt the product.151 A classic example is the telephone: if only one con-
sumer owns a phone, it is not particularly valuable, but if many consumers
own it, its value increases exponentially. A more modern example is offered
by social media networks such as Facebook or Twitter, in which consumers of
the product value the product more highly as additional consumers enter the
market.
Regulations, just like products, often benefit from network effects. Cer-
tain regulations grow in value as they are more widely adopted by otherjuris-
dictions, largely because of the positive externalities of each adoption. Once
a regulation has reached a certain level of acceptance, it becomes very
unlikely that states will adopt other, incompatible regulations. This is so
because the network effects of the widely accepted regulatory structure can
easily swamp any other potential benefits of the regulation. This phenome-
non is often referred to as path dependence-today's decisions or arrange-
ments are strongly influenced by initial decisions or arrangements.'52 While
149 See State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct.
1, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx. It is
perhaps worth noting that some scholars have viewed the proliferation of renewable port-
folio standards among the states as an example of the race to the top. See, e.g., Barry Rabe,
Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards, SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POL'v, Spring 2007, at 10, 11. The argument here is that over time states have
steadily increased the proportion of energy that must generated from renewable sources.
McAllister, supra note 91, at 86; Rabe, supra, at 12. But later studies have questioned these
empirical conclusions. See Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is There a
"Race" and Is It "to the Top"?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 3, 49-77 (2012).
150 See Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as Public Goods, 20 J.
PUB. EcoN. 231, 231-32 (1983); Esty, supra note 64, at 619; Farrell & Saloner, supra note
106, at 70; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibil-
ity, 75 A-M. EcoN. REv. 424 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and
Network Effects, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93; Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate
Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. Rev. 757 (1995); Lemley & McGowan, supra note
136, at 515-16; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon
Tragedy, J. EcoN. PERse., Spring 1994, at 133.
151 Lemley & McGowan, supra note 136, at 482-83.
152 See generally David, supra note 136, at 332; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path
Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 205, 210 (1995); William Magnuson,
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the point seems like an obvious one (how could past decisions not affect
today's decisions), the consequences are significant. In areas that exhibit
strong path dependency, inefficient initial arrangements can seriously skew
future decisions in a way that impedes more desirable reforms. Once a par-
ticular regulatory structure has become widely adopted, and the network
effects are sufficiently high, the cost of switching to other regulatory struc-
tures that might ab initio have been more efficient can become prohibitive.
But it is important to note that not all regulations benefit from the same
levels of interoperability benefits, and thus the race to the middle will have
stronger or lesser force as a result. The extent of the interoperability benefits
will depend, among other things, on the nature of the regulation and the
activity regulated. Where there are large economies of scale or regulations
are sufficiently complex that complying with multiple structures reaches a
certain level of cost, interoperability benefits should push states to adopt mid-
dle structures, rather than top or bottom ones. On the other hand, when
economies of scale do not exist or regulatory regimes do not impose high
costs on actors, interoperability benefits will play a less important role in
affecting the race to the middle.
4. Intervention
The final factor that drives states toward a race to the middle is the risk
of federal intervention.1 53 The observation here is a simple one: it is more
likely that the national government will act to strike down a state's regulation
if that regulation is an outlier. If, on the other hand, the state's regulation is
well within the norms of behavior of other states, the national government
will be less likely to intervene. To the extent that states seek to prevent the
national government from stepping in to challenge or preempt their laws,
The Public Cost ofPrivate Equity, 102 MINN. L. REv. 1847, 1890 (2018); Stephen E. Margolis &
S.J. Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAw 17 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
153 For discussions of the role of federal intervention in reaction to state law, see
Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: Federal 
Intervention and
State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 199 (2011); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice, 87 VA. L. REV. 993
(2001); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1793 (2006); Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism
Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REv. 217, 218 (2014) ("The observed inability of states to produce a
collective good by acting together might therefore be a reliable signal of when federal
intervention is needed."); Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 13, at 601 (arguing that
"Delaware players have reason to fear that if they misstep, they will lose their lawmaking
business" because they know that "the federal authorities, even if not breathing down their
necks at every moment, could act if they so chose"); Robert B. Thompson, Delaware's Domi-
nance: A Peculiar Illustration of American Federalism, in CAN DEIAWARE BE DETHRONED? 57
(Stephen M. Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018) (discussing historical developments regarding
the apportionment of corporate lawmaking responsibility between federal and state
governments).
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they will have an interest in adopting regulations that look similar to those of
their peers, rather than distinguishing themselves from the crowd.1 54
Federal intervention may take a number of forms. First, and most for-
mally, it may come in the form of congressional action: Congress may pass
laws to prohibit states from enacting regulations with certain content.'5 5 in
some cases, Congress may be quite specific in the types of laws they are target-
ing. For example, when several states passed burdensome laws concerning
trucking and shipping operations in their states, laws that made it more diffi-
cult for new entrants to compete with incumbent trucking companies, Con-
gress stepped in to prohibit the practice, enacting in 1995 a law that
prohibited stating from enacting or enforcing any "law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or ser-
vice of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of prop-
erty."'5 6 Second, it may come in the form of actions by regulatory bodies or
federal prosecutors seeking to challenge the state law as contrary to federal
or constitutional law. A recent example of this kind of federal intervention
has been seen in the debate around so-called "sanctuary cities," or cities that
seek to protect immigrants from deportation under federal law.15 7 After
President Trump took office in 2017, he issued an executive order for the
Secretary of Homeland Security to prioritize deportation and to ensure that
"sanctuary jurisdictions" that refuse to comply with their orders are held inel-
igible for federal grants.'5 8 Outlier states found that federal intervention
could prove a powerful tool to thwart their legislative priorities.
Whatever its form, federal intervention in state regulation is more likely
in the case of states with regulations that are viewed as outliers, or more
extreme than the regulations of the majority of states. This is so for a num-
ber of reasons. First, outlier states are more likely to garner public attention
and, thus, become the subject of politically motivated action. If a state adopts
a law that looks quite similar to laws in other jurisdictions, it is less likely to
gain political attention and salience. On the other hand, if a state adopts a
law that goes much further than other states, either in pandering to powerful
interests (in the case of races to the bottom) or in creating more efficient
154 Of course, there is public-choice literature suggesting that states sometimes prefer
to allow the national government to intervene and thus give the state lawmakers a credible
way to deflect criticism from their citizens for the content of their laws. See generally Morris
P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PuB.
CHoIcE 33 (1982); Morris Fiorina, Rational Choice and the New(?) Institutionalism, 28 POLIrY
107 (1995); Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REv. 875 (2008); Christina
E. Wells, Katrina and the Rhetoric of Federalism, 26 Miss. C. L. REv. 127, 143 (2006).
155 See generally Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 153 (describing the efforts of the fed-
eral government to replace state laws governing the duties of corporate insiders).
156 ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 103, 109 Stat. 803, 899 (codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) (1) (2012)).
157 See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding "Sanctuary Cities, "59 B.C. L. REv. 1703
(2018).
158 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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solutions to long-term problems (in the case of races to the top), the law is
more likely to become a hot-button issue in public discussion.
1 59
Second, outlier states are more likely to have regulations that lead to
extreme results that create demand for a federal response. State regulations
that strongly favor the interests of one group over another can be expected
to mobilize burdened groups to react, either by lobbying the state govern-
ment to change its law or, if those efforts are ineffectual, by appealing to the
federal government.16 0 But regulations that simply copy the regulations in
place in other jurisdictions can be expected to have more moderate effects
on the interests of stakeholder groups and, thus, should generate fewer
demands for intervention from the federal government.'
6 1
Perhaps it is an obvious point, but states fear federal intervention
because it prevents them from enacting the laws they desire. Federal inter-
vention by definition removes regulatory powers from the state and transfers
it to the federal government, and thereby reduces the policy choices available
to states. State legislators can no longer respond to the demands of their
electorate by legislating in the area and thus may leave their constituencies
restive.162 Federal intervention can also have real financial consequences for
the state. For example, when South Dakota refused to raise its minimum
drinking age to twenty-one, despite the demands of Congress in the National
Minimum Drinking Age Act, the federal government withheld federal high-
way funding from the state.'63 Such conditional spending is common and
can act as a powerful tool to pressure states toward more harmonized laws.
16 4
To be sure, in some cases, corporations may prefer federal action to state
regulation, and thus, far from fearing federal intervention, they may actively
desire it. Federal action, after all, can guarantee uniform legal structures
across all states. And it can ensure that these benefits are not susceptible to
later revision by state governments. But corporations will not always prefer
federal intervention to state action. If, for example, they believe that they
can achieve more desirable regulatory structures under state law than federal
159 See, e.g., THOMAS G. HANSFORD &JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2006); Robert A. Bernstein, Directing Electoral Appeals Away from
the Center: Issue Position and Issue Salience, 48 POL. REs. Q. 479 (1995); Christopher WIezien,
On the Salience of Political Issues: The Problem with 'Most Important Problem,' 24 ELECTORAL
STUD. 555 (2005).
160 See Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 13, at 601.
161 In pure races to the top, however, the risk of federal intervention may also be lower.
Efficient regulations by definition promote the mutual interests of all groups and thus
should not generate strong demand for federal intervention to change the regulations,
except in those cases where a previously favored group loses its advantages under the new,
more efficient rules.
162 But see supra note 154.
163 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
164 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentation,
98 Conum. L. REv. 267, 425-26 (1998); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and
State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUm. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1988); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1415-17 (1989).
[VOL. 95-31214
THE RACE TO THE MIDDLE
law, they will prefer state action to federal action. Similarly, if they believe
that federal action will be slow or delayed, a not implausible scenario in
today's gridlocked Congress, they may prefer to focus their attentions on
state law. In any case, federal intervention may have negative consequences
not just for state regulators but also for the entities that are regulated by
them.
B. The Consequences of the Race to the Middle
If the race to the bottom leads states to adopt laxer and more inefficient
rules than their neighbors, while the race to the top leads states to adopt
stricter and more efficient rules than their neighbors, the race to the middle
causes states, instead, to imitate their neighbors.'6 5 Far from seeking to dis-
tinguish their regulatory models from the regulatory models present in other
jurisdictions, states seek to adopt regulatory models that represent something
akin to a consensus position. The ultimate result of the race to the middle is
that state law becomes increasingly consistent, stable, and, except in certain
extraordinary circumstances, unchanging.
In order to better understand the contours of the race to the middle, it
is perhaps helpful to examine a hypothetical race. While this game theoreti-
cal model will necessarily be oversimplified, it demonstrates the power of the
dynamic and how it is distinguishable from other types of races. To be sure,
it presents the easiest case for a race to the middle-most real-life races will
include variables that the hypothetical cannot capture. But once the initial
dynamic is firmly established, we can begin to understand its limits.
Imagine there are two states, Amity and Comity, that are part of the
United States but are located on a far-off continent and thus do business
primarily with one another.'6 6 Each state is currently considering a reform
to its corporate law. Neither legislature has updated its corporate law statute
for some time, and thus their current laws are out of date and do not reflect
developments in the corporate world. They have, however, reviewed the cor-
porate statutes in other states to better understand their options, and they
are now deciding on their final bills.
Race-to-the-bottom theorists would argue that Amity and Comity have
two basic options. First, they can attempt to improve on other states' corpo-
rate laws, in an effort to craft a more efficient model. Alternatively, they can
attempt to undercut other states' corporate laws, in an effort to curry favor
with powerful corporations. Under a race-to-the-bottom model, the per-
165 As mentioned above in Section IB, some scholars use the race-to-the-bottom rubric
to describe a race to laxer standards, while others use it to describe a race to more ineffi-
cient standards. The same confusion exists among race-to-the-top scholars. See Swire,
supra note 1, at 69-70.
166 For the purposes of simplicity, the hypothetical is structured as a two-player game.
For further discussion of the permutations of such games in the development of legal
structures, see DouCLAs G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw (1994); JAMES D.
MoRow, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS (1994); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A.
Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1113 (1999).
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ceived interests of the states in undercutting their neighbors outweigh any
opposing interests in improving the substantive content of their laws. This
strategic situation places them in a type of prisoner's dilemma: mutually, they
would be better off if they adopted more efficient corporate law statutes, but,
individually, each perceives an interest in defecting and undercutting its
neighbor.16 7 Importantly, regardless of the action taken by the other state,
each state is better off if it undercuts the other state's corporate laws. This
dominant strategy thus ensures that states will race toward less and less desir-
able regulatory structures as they seek to attract corporate presence. Table 1
below illustrates such a situation.
TABLE 1: THE RACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM GAME
Comity
Undercut Improve
Amity Undercut 2, 2 4,1
Improve 1, 4 3, 3
Race-to-the-top theorists would agree on Amity and Comity's two basic
options, but they disagree on the relative values of those options. Under a
race-to-the-top model, the perceived interests of the states in improving their
corporate laws greatly outweigh any interest in undercutting their neighbors.
This strategic situation creates a type of virtuous "coincidence-of-interest"
game, in which both states have strong interests in adopting progressively
more efficient laws.168 It is important to note that in this situation, each state
has marginally higher payoffs if it improves its corporate law while the other
state does not. This is so because the states are still competing to attract
corporations to their jurisdictions, and thus if their own laws are more effi-
cient than the laws of their neighbors, they will gain a competitive advantage.
But such an interest does not negate the basic dynamic in the game, which
leads to states continually seeking to improve the efficiency and desirability
of their regulatory structures. Table 2 below illustrates such a situation.
TABLE 2: THE RACE-TO-THE-TOP GAME
Comity
Undercut Improve
Undercut 2, 2 1,4
Improve 4, 1 3, 3
167 See MoRRow, supra note 166, at 263-68.
168 See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 166, at 1122.
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But what if Amity and Comity's options are not limited to just undercut-
ting or improving on other states' corporate laws? What if, instead, they have
a third option-attempting to copy other states' laws in an effort to model
their laws on precedent? Let us integrate into this model the concept that
enacting the majority rule in place in other jurisdictions provides a set of
benefits to the state-in the form of informational effects, familiarity effects,
interoperability effects, and intervention effects. Table 3 below illustrates
such a situation.
TABLE 3: THE RACE-TO-THE-MIDDLE GAME
Comity
Undercut Copy Improve
Undercut 2, 2 1, 3 2, 2
Amity Copy 3, 1 4,4 3, 1
Improve 2, 2 1, 3 3, 3
As shown above, under the race-to-the-middle game, choosing the mid-
dle strategy, or copying the laws in place in other jurisdictions, is a dominant
strategy. Regardless of what the other state does, the acting state is better off
if it adopts a majority rule. This is so because the state realizes a benefit from
harmonizing its rule with the rules from other jurisdictions. Under this styl-
ized example, the benefit from situating one's state in the "middle" of regula-
tions outweighs any benefits from adopting a marginally more efficient rule
or, alternatively, adopting a rule marginally more attractive to powerful inter-
est groups.
The structure of the race-to-the-middle game leads to dramatically differ-
ent results in the quality and distribution of law as compared with either the
race-to-the-bottom model of federalism or the race-to-the-top model. The
race-to-the-bottom dynamic leads states progressively to worsen their laws in
pursuit of competitive advantage. As a result, the distribution of laws should
tend to cluster near the "lower" end of efficiency. The race-to-the-top
dynamic leads to the opposite result: states progressively improve their laws
in pursuit of competitive advantage. As a consequence, the distribution of
laws in a race to the top should tend to cluster near the "upper" end of
efficiency. The race-to-the-middle dynamic, on the other hand, leads states
progressively to harmonize their laws. As a result, the distribution of laws in a
race to the middle will cluster more and more at a single point in the effi-
ciency spectrum.
In order to better illustrate how the various races affect the quality of law
over time, consider a set of states at an initial point in time (prior to the devel-
opment of any races). Assume the quality of regulation is normally distrib-
uted, that is, that a few states have particularly low-quality regulation, a few
states have particularly high-quality regulation, and the majority have some-
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thing in between, neither exceptionally efficient nor exceptionally inefficient
rules. Figure 1 below illustrates such a distribution.




Under the race-to-the-bottom dynamic, with states consistently choosing
to adopt worse law in order to cater to the interests of powerful constituen-
cies, the quality of overall law within the states should steadily shift states
toward the lower end of the spectrum of efficiency. The result should even-
tually resemble a log-normal distribution, with a cluster of states near the
bottom and a few laggard states with more efficient laws in the long tail.
Figure 2 below illustrates such a result.




Similarly, under a race to the top, with states consistently seeking to
improve the quality and efficiency of their laws, the overall quality of law
should steadily shift higher. The result should eventually resemble a flipped
version of the race to the bottom, with a cluster of states near the high end of
the spectrum of efficiency, and a few laggard states with less efficient laws in
the long tail. Figure 3 below illustrates such a result.
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But the race to the middle leads to a very different result. Instead of
leading to clusters of states at the upper or lower ends of regulatory quality,
the race to the middle pushes states toward the preexisting dominant focal
point of regulatory quality. So, if at the initial point in time, states were nor-
mally distributed along the spectrum of efficient laws, then the race to the
middle should cause them to increasingly congregate at the midpoint of the
distribution. Instead of shifting upward or downward in quality, the race sim-
ply reduces variation. Figure 4 below illustrates such a result.




It should perhaps be noted here that the race-to-the-middle dynamic
does not mean that states will necessarily congregate at a regulatory quality
that is halfway between the two extremes of perfect efficiency and perfect
inefficiency. As an initial matter, it seems unlikely that perfectly efficient law
and perfectly inefficient law are sufficiently quantifiable that there even exists
a "halfway" point. Take one commonly debated question in corporate law:
the proper treatment of takeover defenses. Assuming that we can agree on
the proper goals of corporate law,169 and, further, that we can agree on
169 This, of course, is already an ambitious assumption, and one that is consistently
proven ill founded. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 549 (2003); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733, 735-36 (2005); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring
Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 638 (2006);
Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder
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whether those goals are promoted or undermined by takeover defenses,1
70 it
still is unclear that useful definitions of "perfectly efficient" and "perfectly
inefficient" versions of takeover-defense law could be described with any
numerical specificity. If we believe that corporate law's sole goal is to pro-
mote shareholder value and that takeover defenses destroy shareholder
value, is the perfectly efficient rule the one that prohibits all takeover
defenses and the perfectly inefficient rule the one that allows all takeover
defenses? Or is the perfectly efficient rule the one that affirmatively incen-
tivizes takeovers, and the perfectly inefficient rule the one that affirmatively
requires corporations to adopt all known (and future) takeover defenses?
Would the halfway point be the rule that half of all takeover defenses are
legal and half are not? As one can see, the question quickly devolves into
confusion.
But more substantively, the race to the middle does not necessarily lead
to a race to "mediocrity." In some cases, the initial focal point among states
for a particular regulatory structure may already be quite efficient. In others,
it may be quite inefficient. In either case, the race to the middle will tend to
push states toward that level of efficiency that has already been established.
In essence, the race to the middle pushes states toward a harmonization of
their laws, irrespective of the relative efficiency of that law.1
7 '
Now that the basic outlines of the race to the middle, and how it differs
from the races to the extremes, have been set out, we may now proceed to
examining the key conditions that make races to the middle possible. As the
next Section will make clear, federalism does not necessarily lead to races to
the middle-it just creates an environment in which such races are more
likely.
Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 (2009); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439
(2001); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1189 (2002).
170 Another dubious assumption. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs
ofEntrenched Boards, 78J. FIN. EcoN. 409, 409-10 (2005); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L.
REV. 1161, 1163-64 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 819-21 (1981); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1028,
1030-31 (1982).
171 See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonization in European Com-
pany Law, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 190 (Daniel C. Esry &
Damien Geradin eds., 2001); Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case
Study of TRIPS Implementation in India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1572
(2009); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, The Non-Uniformity of Uniform Laws, 35 J.
CORP. L. 327, 328 (2009); Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmoniza-
tion Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE
L.J. 85, 94-99, 102-08 (2007).
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C. Conditions for Races to the Middle
The race to the middle occurs when states increasingly seek to assimilate
their laws to dominant legal paradigms already existing in other states. The
dynamic is made possible by the principles of federalism embedded in our
constitutional system, and it is encouraged by several factors, including infor-
mational effects, familiarity effects, interoperability effects, and federal inter-
vention effects. But the mere observation that states have some interests in
racing to the middle does not tell us whether they will, in fact, do so, or,
more importantly, whether their interests in racing to the middle will over-
come other interests pushing them to the top or the bottom. So when pre-
cisely should the race-to-the-middle dynamic be expected to trump race-to-
the-top or race-to-the-bottom dynamics in state regulation?
As an initial matter, races to the middle are more likely to occur when
the informational benefits from previous regulations, the desire among stake-
holders for familiar regulations, the importance of interoperability among
state regulations, and the risk of federal intervention for outlier regulations
are all high.172 Conversely, when these factors are less important to an issue
area, or are not present at all, races to the middle are less likely to develop.
In such situations, we would expect the value of "middle" regulations to
decrease as compared with differential or niche regulations that are more
consistent with the race-to-the-extreme models of federalism.
While it would be impossible to list all potential scenarios in which the
benefits of racing to the middle are high, a few important conditions can be
identified. First, when the preferences of the regulated group are relatively
homogenous, a race to the middle is more likely.' 73 One might posit, for
example, that corporations have a relatively homogenous interest with
respect to corporate income taxes-they prefer them to be low.' 7 4 On the
other hand, individuals have significantly less homogenous preferences with
respect to contentious social issues such as abortion or gun control.'7 5 In the
172 See supra Section II.A.
173 For a discussion of the role of homogenous preferences in regulatory competition,
see Bratton & McCahery, supra note 49, at 251-53; Dennis C. Mueller, Centralism, Federal-
ism, and the Nature of Individual Preferences, 12 CONST. POL. EcoN. 161, 162-64 (2001).
174 Even this anodyne proposition is not without its exceptions, of course. For exam-
ple, after President Trump enacted a tax bill that cut corporate income tax rates from 35%
to 21%, several companies, such as General Motors and Citigroup, took large charges to
their earnings. They did so because the reduction in tax rates reduced the value of
deferred tax assets (in other words, losses from previous years that could be used to offset
income in future years). See Michael Rapoport, Why New Tax Law Cost Citigroup, GM $29
Billion, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-new-tax-law-cost-
citigroup-gm-29-billion-1516132375.
175 A recent poll found that 57% of Americans believe that abortion should be legal in
all or most cases, while 40% believe that it should be illegal in all or most cases. See Public
Opinion on Abortion, PEw RES. CTR. (Aug. 29, 2019), http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/
public-opinion-on-abortion/. Similarly, a 2016 poll found that 50% of Americans are more
concerned that government will go too far in restricting gun rights, while 47% of Ameri-
cans are more concerned that government will not do enough to regulate access to guns.
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former case, it is more likely that states will face similar incentives and thus
can coordinate their regulations, while in the latter case, there is a greater
likelihood that states will adopt diverging paths in order to appeal to discrete
sectors of the population.
Second, when the regulatory regime at issue is complex, races to the
middle are more likely.1 7
6 When regulations are simple and straightforward,
states have little to gain from the experiences and information effects of
other states. The cost of formulating new laws is lower, and thus the risk of
distinguishing one's own regulations from other state regulations is lower.
On the other hand, regulations that require complex rules and standards of
behavior to be formulated introduce new variables and risks for both states
and constituencies, and thus the benefits of adopting well-tested regimes
increase. Every effort to revise and amend behavioral rules is costly, regard-
less of whether the aim is to make the rules more attractive to favored groups
or to make them more efficient.'
7 7 Legislative processes are slow and cum-
bersome, particularly when the legislation is complex and affects a number
of interest groups.178 And as these regulations become more extreme, the
cost of marginal improvements should increase. In these scenarios, states
may well decide to take the middle approach in order to avoid the hard work
of choosing sides on contentious issues.
In order to illustrate these points, it may be worthwhile to examine a few
real-world examples of races to the middle. In these cases, far from con-
stantly seeking to distinguish their regulations from other states, states have
instead quickly coalesced around consensus regulatory outcomes. Their
decisions have been driven by some combination of informational effects,
familiarity, interoperability, and intervention risk.
1 7 9
One example of a race to the middle that has led to remarkable uni-
formity in state law is the proliferation of limited liability companies in the
last few decades.18 0 Until 1977, there were two basic forms of business organ-
See Carrie Dann, Poll: Voters Divided on Government Role in Gun Control, Access, NBC NEWS
(June 26, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/poll-voters-divided-govern
ment-role-gun-control-access-n598676?cid=par-aff-nbc-wrc_20160626.
176 For a more in-depth discussion of the role of legal complexity in society, see CASs R.
SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013); Adam I. Muchmore, Uncertainty,
Complexity, and Regulatory Design, 53 Hous. L. REV. 1321 (2016); Peter H. Schuck, Legal
Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992).
177 See Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Triage in a Volatile Political Era, 117 COLUM. L.
REv. ONLINE 240, 250-51 (2017) (describing the limited capacity of agencies to assess the
costs and benefits of regulatory programs).
178 Id.
179 It should be noted that, in all of these cases, an argument could be made that the
resulting arrangements are perfectly efficient (and thus a race to the top) or perfectly
inefficient (and thus a race to the bottom). A full discussion of the relative efficiency of
these laws is beyond the scope of this Article, but the high levels of conformity between
states in these areas provides strong evidence that these areas are races to the middle, not
races to the top or bottom, as further discussed above in Section IIA.
180 See Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Fawed Busi-
ness Tax Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 295, 295-96 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark
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ization: corporations and partnerships.'8 1 Corporations granted their share-
holders limited liability for the company's debts, but they also imposed
double taxation on their owners, with the profits of the corporation being
taxed first at the entity level and then again once dividends were distributed
to shareholders. Partnerships, on the other hand, imposed full liability on
the owners for the partnership's debts, but granted their partners pass-
through taxation status, with the profits of the partnership only being taxed
once. But in 1977, the Wyoming legislature created a new entity, the limited
liability company.'8 2 This company incorporated the best characteristics of
both corporations and partnerships: owners had limited liability and, simulta-
neously, single taxation. Initially, the regulatory status of LLCs was in some
doubt-it was unclear whether regulators and judges would recognize the
purported legal attributes of LLCs.'8 3 But in 1988, after the Internal Reve-
nue Service issued a ruling that Wyoming LLCs would be granted pass-
through tax status despite their limited-liability attributes, the LLC quickly
starting proliferating.184 By 1992, eighteen states passed LLC laws.18 5 By
1993, thirty-six passed them.'8 6 By 1996, all fifty states had them.'8 7 The
speed at which LLC regulations proliferated throughout the states was
remarkable, but so was the uniformity of these regulations. One early survey
of LLC provisions in state statutes found that, on average, 62.3% of states
adopted the same substantive provisions with respect to third-party matters
and 62.5% of states adopted the same substantive provisions with respect to
eds., 2005). Some scholars argue that the states' adoption of LLC law is an example of the
race to the bottom. SeeJ. William Callison, Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and the Limited
Liability Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded, 26 J. CORP. L. 951, 954 (2001)
("[T]he states' uncritical adoption of limited liability in reaction to tax regulatory changes
can be viewed as a 'race-to-the-bottom.'"). Others argue that it is a race to the top. See
ERIK P.M. VERMEULEN, THE EVOLUTION OF LECAL BUSINESS FoRMs IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES 83 (2003) ("The LLC . . . tends to evolve towards efficiency."). Others
reject both possibilities. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the
Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629, 633 (1997) (concluding that race-to-the-bottom and race-to-the-
top explanations of LLCs are equally implausible).
181 There are, of course, many variations on these two forms, and the forms themselves
look different in different jurisdictions. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The
Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000); Henry Hansmann et al.,
The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 5.
182 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity:
Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 EcoN. INQUIRY 464, 472 (1996).
183 See Hamill, supra note 180, at 296 (discussing the uncertainty in the 1980s around
how LLCs would be treated by the IRS).
184 See Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIo ST.
L.J. 1459, 1460 (1998).
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tax-related matters.'8 8 Later, after a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(ULLCA) was promulgated, uniformity was even higher: where the ULLCA
followed the "leading form" for a particular provision, an average of 69% of
states adopted the same substantive rule.
8 9 But perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the basic structure of the LLC was firm. States did not seek to outdo
one another with new, potentially even more favorable business structures,
but rather adopted, increasingly over time, the most prevalent regulatory
structure available.'
9 0
Another recent example of a race to the middle can be found in the
regulation of secured financing.
19 1 Secured financing is the process by
which one party to a transaction gains a security interest in the assets of the
other party, meaning that the secured party has a claim on the assets in the
event the other party defaults on its obligations.
1 92 Secured transactions are
widely used by financial institutions, corporations, and other businesses on a
daily basis today, and they often have cross-border elements: a bank may give
a loan to a company in one state, and it may seek security interests in the
company's assets in yet another state.
1 93 With the rise of syndicated loans in
recent years, both the complexity and the importance of secured transactions
have increased exponentially.
1 94 One could imagine that the interests of
powerful actors (say, financial institutions) might cause states to engage-in a
race to the bottom, constantly seeking to reform their secured transactions
laws in a way that favors financial institutions. But instead, states have
adopted remarkably uniform provisions with respect to secured transactions.
In 2010, when the UCC adopted a revision to its secured transactions provi-
188 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 182, at 476; see also ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for
Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 94.
189 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 171, at 340. It should be noted that Professors
Kobayashi and Ribstein conclude that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, which promulgated the ULLCA, is in fact undermining uniformity in
state law, not furthering it. Id. at 329.
190 With time, this uniformity may well increase. For example, one study of the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA), which was originally drafted in 1950, concluded that
87% of states had adopted the MBCA's mandatory provisions. William J. Carney, The Pro-
duction of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 715, 731 (1998).
191 See generally Barry E. Adler & George Triantis, Debt Priority and Options in Bankruptcy:
A Policy Intervention, 91 Am. BANKR. L.J. 563 (2017); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried,
The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996);
Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the
Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REv. 569 (1998); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA.
L. REV. 1783, 1784-85 (1994).
192 For an excellent introduction to the process and results of secured transactions, see
WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS (5th ed. 2012).
193 See, e.g., DELOITTE, GUIDE TO CROSS-BORDER SECURED TRANSACTIONS 1 (2013),
https://www2.deloitte.com/vi/en/pages/Iegal/articles/deloitte-legal-guide-tocross-bord
er-secured-transactions.html.
194 See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan
Market, 39 J. CORP. L. 725, 738-41 (2014).
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sions-contained in article 9 of the UCC-it took less than five years for all
fifty states to adopt the revised provisions.19 5 Perhaps equally striking was the
states' approach to one controversial issue that the UCC left open to states.
Recognizing that there was some disagreement about the proper treatment
of minor mistakes in the identification of debtors on the validity of security
interests, the UCC offered states two alternatives: they could either adopt an
"only if' rule that required strict conformance with the name requirements
of the UCC or they could adopt a "safe harbor" rule that gave additional ways
for creditors to properly identify debtors.19 6 Prior to the revision, states had
adopted widely diverging approaches to the rule. But once states started the
process of revising their statutes, they quickly coalesced around a dominant
strategy. Forty-four of fifty states adopted the "only if' rule, while only six
states (including Delaware) adopted the more lenient "safe harbor" rule.19 7
And it is easy to see why, under a race-to-the-middle model, this result would
occur: secured transactions law is sufficiently complex that the cost of formu-
lating innovative or different law is high; financial institutions and other
large actors have strong interests in operating in jurisdictions that have famil-
iar regimes; and the benefits of interoperable secured transactions regimes
are large.
As both examples demonstrate, races to the middle are most likely to
occur in areas that benefit from strong informational effects, familiarity
effects, interoperability effects, and federal intervention effects. In the case
of LLC law, the majority rule quickly gained acceptance around the country
after initial doubts about its legal effects were resolved and states observed
the popularity of the structure with businesses. In the case of secured trans-
actions law, the rapid acceptance of the revised Uniform Commercial Code
provisions was encouraged by the deep complexity of the law and the simulta-
neous need for interoperable state regimes. And importantly, the level of
uniformity between states casts doubt on the relevance of either race-to-the-
top or race-to-the-bottom models in explaining the spread of the legal
regimes.
111. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RACE TO THE MIDDLE
Legal scholars have long debated how the principles of federalism
embedded in our constitutional system affect the quality and substance of
state law. These debates tend to revolve around two diametrically opposed
positions: the race to the bottom and the race to the top. This Article, how-
ever, has argued that a third dynamic, the race to the middle, provides a
powerful counterweight to these two models, and, in an increasingly complex
195 See PROPOSED 2010 AMENDMENTS TO UCC ARTICLE 9, PRACrICAL LAw PRACrICE NOTE
1-503-4438 (West 2019).
196 See Steven N. Cohen et al., The 2010 Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC: A Primer,
MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/250158/Contract+Law/The+2010+
Amendments+To+Article+9+Of+The+UCC+A+Primer (last updated July 11, 2013).
197 See PROPOSED 2010 AMENDMENTS TO UCC ARTICLE 9, supra note 195.
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regulatory environment, will likely grow in importance. But if we recognize
that the race to the middle is an important dynamic in a federalist system, we
must also recognize that it carries important implications for democratic gov-
ernance. Among other things, it suggests that we must reassess debates about
the virtues and vices of federalism. This Part will examine these questions in
the context of three prominent strands of constitutional law theory.
A. Laboratories of Democracy
One common defense of federalism is that it allows states to experiment
with different ways of governing their citizens.198 By giving states wide regu-
latory discretion, and limiting the power of federal government to intervene
in that discretion, our Constitution is thought to create "laboratories of
democracy" in which states test out new ideas and theories about how best to
arrange their affairs.199 These laboratories, it is hoped, should gradually lead
to better law as new regulatory "innovations" are created and deployed.
2 0 0
The race-to-the-middle dynamic, however, suggests that states are not
the active laboratories of regulation that many assume them to be. Instead of
constantly experimenting with new and innovative regulatory structures,
states often merely copy preexisting regulatory models from other states.
Their tendency to copy rather than innovate is strongest when the regula-
tions at issue are complex and the regulated behavior has cross-border impli-
cations. But these are precisely the kinds of areas in which innovation and
experimentation should be most desired, given their applicability to other
states and the increasing importance of complex regulatory structures.
Where race-to-the-middle dynamics prevail, the state interest in improving
their laws through experimentation will falter. Instead of vibrant laboratories
of democracy, they will become assembly lines of conformity.
What is more, the race to the middle actively disincentivizes states from
engaging in the regulatory entrepreneurship that underlies ideas of demo-
cratic laboratories. After all, if a state spends its time and resources to draft a
new and better law, other states can easily copy these innovations without
bearing the burdens of research and development that the original state did.
And if other states quickly copy the approach, the competitive advantages to
198 See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-91
(1982) (O'Connor,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he
50 States serve as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political
ideas."); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."); Amar, supra note 23, at 1233-36.
199 See Amar, supra note 23, at 1234.
200 See id. (arguing that under a laboratory perspective of federalism, "federalism per-
mits pragmatic testing of novel policy proposals"). But see Wiseman, supra note 111, at
1665-66 (arguing that states may well serve as laboratories, but they often fail to share
information on their successes and failures with other states, thus severely limiting the
upside of regulatory experimentation).
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the initial state will be quickly eliminated. In other words, the second-mover
advantage will disincentivize the first mover from moving at all. 20 1
If states are not the laboratories of democracy that proponents of feder-
alism hope them to be, then discussions about federal powers and states'
rights need to be revised to take this new model into effect. On the one
hand, fears about destructive regulatory competition among states may be
overblown, and thus calls for federal intervention to prevent races to the bot-
tom should become less urgent. On the other, hopes for a virtuous cycle of
ever evolving and improving state law are more precarious than they are
widely believed to be, and thus new mechanisms to incentivize legal reform
must be explored.
B. Tyranny of the Majority
The race to the middle also has important implications for debates
about the limits of majority power. Democracy has long been viewed as a
form of government directly opposed to tyranny, that is, unjust rule by the
individual.20 2 It does, however, raise another kind of risk: the risk of tyranny
of the majority.203 If a group of individuals that make up a majority of the
populace are united in a desire to oppress vulnerable minorities, whether
they be racial groups, religious groups, or ideological groups, democracy pro-
vides them an effective means of doing so. The U.S. Constitution was
designed with these concerns in mind. For example, James Madison wrote
that "the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts
of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in
which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the
Constituents."20 4 Similarly, Thomas Jefferson stated that "though the will of
the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasona-
ble; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must pro-
tect, and to violate would be oppression."2 0 5 In order to reduce concerns
about oppressive majority rule, the Constitution was structured to protect
201 See GILLIAN K HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD 8 (2017) ("Most governments
don't scramble to invent cheaper, simpler, and more effective ways of regulating so they
can attract more users to their system.").
202 See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITIcs 78 (Stephen Everson ed., Jonathan Barnes trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 275-324 (Desmond Lee trans., Penguin
Books 2d ed. 2003).
203 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 251 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969) (1835) ("What is a majority, in its collective capacity, if
not an individual with opinions, and usually with interests, contrary to those of another
individual, called the minority?").
204 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), as reprinted in 1
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 121, 122 (Louis H. Pollak ed., 1966) (empha-
sis omitted).
205 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGs 492, 492-93 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
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minorities in a number of ways,20 6 from dividing powers among government
branches, to protecting free speech rights of citizens, to guaranteeing the
free exercise of religion.
Federalism has long been thought to serve as an effective bulwark
against tyrannies of the majority.
207 By dispersing government powers
among a wide variety of polities, each with different interests and constitu-
ents, federalism serves to reduce concerns that a centralized power can force
its will on the populace at large.2
08 Thus, decentralized decisionmaking, it is
thought, should help prevent large groups from intentionally discriminating
against disfavored minorities.
But the race to the middle suggests that federalism raises a different type
of tyranny-of-the-majority problem. If states are racing to adopt the regula-
tory scheme that is dominant among other states, then majority approaches
to regulatory problems gain an outsized weight in state decisionmaking.
States that have different or opposed preferences may feel obliged to adopt
nonoptimal (from their perspective) regulatory regimes simply because
other states are doing so. And as more states adopt the majority approach,
these forces should only increase in power.
Of course, the harms from this type of tyranny of the majority are poten-
tially less objectionable than the harms from the classical version of the tyr-
anny of the majority. The harm, in this case, stems not from the forcible
oppression of the few by the many, but rather from the benefits that the few
derive from willingly associating with the many. States receive a number of
valuable benefits from assimilating their laws to the laws of other states, and
many of these benefits accrue to their own citizens as well. States are volunta-
rily adopting the laws of the majority, and therefore where the race to the
middle occurs, it occurs, not from direct oppression, but rather from an
intentional exercise of legislative will.
But setting aside the question of whether the race to the *middle raises
concerns about state decisionmaking, it certainly indicates the power of
momentum in federalism. Where it occurs, the race to the middle creates a
set of path dependent effects among state regulations that are difficult to
overcome. And if a sufficiently large group of states adopt similar regula-
tions, those initial decisions can have an outsized effect on the shape and
substance of other states' regulations. Federalism may, thus, lead to a tyr-
anny of the consensus position.
206 See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784 (1983).
207 But see FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), reprinted in THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION: FOR AND AGAINST 150, 155-56 (J.R. Pole ed., 1987) (arguing that factions are more
likely to predominate in small localities, as opposed to the large nation).
208 See Will Kymlicka, Federalism and Secession: At Home and Abroad, 13 CANADIAN J.L. &
JURIS. 207, 213 (2000); Richard Simeon & Daniel-Patrick Conway, Federalism and the Man-
agement of Conflict in Multinational Societies, in MULTINATIONAL DEMOCRACIES 338, 340 (Alain-
G. Gagnon & James Tully eds., 2001).
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C. Voting with Your Feet
Finally, the race to the middle has important implications for debates
around voter choice and voter mobility. Federalism has long been thought
to promote citizen autonomy by allowing citizens to choose among a variety
of state regimes: if citizens do not like the government of the state in which
they reside, they can "vote with their feet" and move elsewhere.209 Indeed,
some scholars have argued that voting with one's feet is the primary way in
which individual citizens can influence their governments' dictates.2 10 After
all, voting with one's ballot-that is, actual voting-has little to no chance of
affecting the result of an election, given the low likelihood that one vote will
swing an election that includes millions of other votes.2 1' Thus, federalism
has the advantage of giving citizens true political autonomy-they can
choose to associate with the state governments of their choice.
An important premise of the argument about the choice-promoting
effects of federalism is that citizens in fact have real choices between regula-
tory regimes-that is, that they can choose from a range of governments and
laws that differ in meaningful ways. If, instead, citizens can only choose
between states that have largely consistent regulatory structures, they cannot
be said to have a true choice in governmental form. They will be bound by
the same regulatory structures and rules whether they stay in their home state
or they move elsewhere. If states, acting alone, decline to adopt sufficiently
diverse regulations among themselves, then federalism's promise of promot-
ing citizen choice will be in vain.
But of course, as this Article has demonstrated, the race-to-the-middle
dynamic creates strong pressures for states to reduce or eliminate differences
in their laws. In order to take advantage of informational, familiarity, and
interoperability benefits, states have a number of interests in harmonizing
their laws with the majority approach of other states. Where the race to the
middle occurs, then, citizen choice is necessarily diminished. State law
becomes more uniform and nondistinct, and the range of available regimes
declines. Voting with your feet is an ineffectual remedy when the race to the
middle prevails.
To be sure, the race to the middle will not eliminate all state differences.
Not all laws are subject to race-to-the-middle dynamics. And even where they
are, the race-to-the-middle dynamic may not overcome other, contrary pres-
sures pushing states toward other regulatory outcomes. In some cases, strong
local preferences in favor of outlier or niche regulatory structures may be
more powerful than any interest in the informational benefits of more com-
209 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES To DECLINE IN
FIRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970); Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political
Freedom, 55 Nomos 83 (2014); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Thery of Local Expenditures, 64J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956); Mark E. Warren, Voting with Your Feet: Exit-Based Empowerment in
Democratic Theory, 105 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 683 (2011).
210 See Somin, supra note 209, at 83-84.
211 Id. at 83.
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monly adopted forms of regulation.
2 12 In addition, there may be benefits for
some states "specializing" their laws in order to appeal to certain subgroups
of actors.213 The most obvious case here is Delaware,
2 14 which is widely
known as a corporation-friendly jurisdiction, but other examples include Cal-
ifornia2 15 (with its particularly stringent environmental regulations) and
Texas2 16 (with its small-government, low-tax structure).
But even if the race to the middle does not lead to an elimination of
state differences, it does suggest that the choice-promoting effects of federal-
ism are overstated. Where the dynamic is strong, federalism can be expected
to produce relatively uniform laws. This result would not be predicted by the
race-to-the-extreme models of federalism, which, regardless of their indepen-
dent merits, have the benefit of promoting freedom of choice. The race to
the middle, on the other hand, reduces the range of policy choices available
to citizens and undermines claims that "voting with your feet" is an effective
method of individual autonomy.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the dominant paradigms for understanding
federalism are flawed. Both race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom theories
of federalism rely on the assumption that states seek to distinguish their laws
from those of their neighbor states-either by steadily undercutting, or by
steadily improving on, their legal regimes. This assumption has often led
commentators to the same tired policy prescriptions: either we need to
increase federal intervention in order to prevent races to the bottom or we
need to decrease federal intervention in order to enable races to the top.
But, this Article has argued, both race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom
theories of federalism fail to account for the strong state interest in adopting
laws that resemble or match prevalent laws in place in other jurisdictions.
States that do so benefit from a number of valuable side effects, including
greater information for legislators, more familiar legal regimes for corpora-
tions, and more interoperable legal rules. This state interest in conformity
leads them to race to the middle, as more and more states adopt the plurality
regulatory regime.
The consequences of the race to the middle are very much a mixed bag.
On the one hand, it assuages concerns about the destructive effects of unfair
competition between states. On the other, it casts doubt on optimistic assess-
212 See Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects offuris-
dictional Competition on Regulatory Standards, 54 J. EcON. LITERATURE 52, 54 (2016).
213 See id.
214 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Essay, Vigorous Race or Leisurely
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553 (2002); Rob-
ert Dames, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62J. FIN. ECON. 525, 526 (2001); Marcel
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ments that federalism should lead to efficient law. When the race to the
middle occurs, instead, we should see a drop in the diversity of laws. This
reduces room for policy innovation by states, and it narrows the range of
regulatory regimes available to citizens and companies. It also leads to the
possibility that initial decisions by a small number of states will have large
effects on future policy results, even if those initial decisions do not reflect
the interests of a sizeable portion of society. The race to the middle suggests
that we must rethink fundamental understandings about federalism's effects
on the quality of law. It also calls for us to seek to find new ways of spurring
policy innovation in a world of increasing conformity.
